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HAS THE U.S. SUPREME COURT FINALLY DRAINED 
THE SWAMP OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE?: 
THE IMPACT OF LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA 
COASTAL COUNCIL ON WETLANDS AND COASTAL 
BARRIER BEACHES 
Hope M. Babcock* 
Law is the foundation on which property rests and is, therefore, 
the formal expression of a community's relationship to nature.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution bars 
the government from "taking" private property for public use with-
out just compensation.2 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment thus acts as a restraint on the government's use of its "police 
power" authority to appropriate and regulate private property, and 
functions as an important screen protecting individual liberty from 
governmental intrusions.3 The language of the Takings Clause ap-
pears clear and deceptively simple, but applying that language has 
proven to be extremely troublesome for the U.S. Supreme Court.4 
* Professor Babcock is currently a Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center. She was general counsel to the National Audubon Society from 1987 to 
1991 and has also served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary-Energy and Minerals at the 
U.S. Department of Interior. Professor Babcock was of counsel to a consortium of 
environmental organizations and coastal towns on an amicus curiae brief filed with the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the case that is the focus of this Article-Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council. Thanks are owed to Peter Byrne, Richard Diamond, Richard Chused, and 
others on the Georgetown law faculty for their comments on an earlier version of this 
Article. 
1. William J. Cronon, Kennecott Journey, in UNDER AN OPEN SKY: RETHINKING 
AMERICA'S WESTERN PAST 43 (William J. Cronon et al. eds., ·1992). 
2. The Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3. For somewhat contrasting views of the role of property as a protector of all other 
constitutional rights, see Carol M. Rose~ The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitu-
tional History of Property Rights, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 238 (1993) (reviewing James 
W. Ely, Jr., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992) and Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 
29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Property]). 
4. For some examples of critical commentary on the muddle of the modem takings 
1 
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In 1991, attention focused on a pending challenge to the con-
stitutionality of a state statute preventing beachfront property own-
ers from developing their land and on whether the Supreme Court 
might use the case to clarify the takings doctrine. 5 This Article will 
not address the question of whether the Court in fact clarified 
takings law in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 6 It will 
focus only tangentially on the vociferously debated question of the 
extent to which the decision has chang~d the regulatory takings 
doctrine first announced by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon.1 This discussion focuses on the Lucas decision's 
doctrine, see Frank L. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of the "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); 
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 51 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 561 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 14 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) 
[hereinafter Sax, Takings]; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad-Hockery: A Comment on 
Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1697 (1988). For a concise, well-structured view of the 
takings doctrine, see Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New 
Takings Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 51 TENN. L. REv. 577 (1990) (arguing 
that property and its regulation are aligned in overlapping evolutionary relationships) 
[hereinafter Rose, Property Rights]. For a fresh perspective on takings jurispruden'ce, see 
Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993) (re-animating phrase "for public use" 
as better yardstick for determining when compensation is required) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, 
Usings]. 
5. The Court granted review of several property cases in the 1991 Term, but only 
Lucas resulted in a major discussion of the takings doctrine as it relates to this Article. 
See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (holding that mobile home rent 
control law was not physical taking of landowner's property); PFZ Properties, Inc. v. 
Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that agency did not violate substantive 
due process under § 1983 when it refused to process company's construction drawings), 
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991) , cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992). The Court 
denied certiorari in Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 
1991) (affirming that city ordinance conditioning nonresidential building permit on pay-
ment of fee to offset burdens caused by low income workers does not effect taking), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992). 
6. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For some examples of commentaries maintaining that the 
Court muddied the takings doctrine in the Lucas decision, see William W. Fisher III, The 
Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (1993) (criticizing majority opinion for, among 
other things, incorporating nuisance doctrine into takings jurisprudence); Richard A. 
Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 
STAN. L. REv. 1369 (1993) (stating that Lucas addresses small universe of takings cases, 
does not deal with partial or temporary restrictions on land use, and backs off strict per 
se rule); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 955 (1993) (stating that 
substantive opinions cannot break free of implicit assumption that any coherent account 
of Takings Clause must allow political processes of land use planning and of economic 
regulation to proceed) [hereinafter Epstein, Seven Deadly Sins]. See also Daniel A. Farber, 
Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279 (1992) (stating that 
Lucas rule does not identify regulations that are functionally equivalent to government 
land acquisitions). For the view that Lucas brought much-needed and long-awaited 
guidance on the topic, see Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individual, and 
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reliance on the common law to provide a set of guidelines by 
which the constitutionality of governmental exercise of regulatory 
authority can be measured.8 Much .has been written about the Lucas 
Court's reliance on the common law of nuisance as an exception 
to the rule that real property owners must be compensated when 
all economically b~ne:Qcial use of their property has been extin-
guished.9 This Article, however, concentrates on the Court's refer-
ence to "background principles of the State's law of property" as 
a rationale for compensation. Specifically, the Article examines the 
effect of the Lucas Court's infusion of common law property doc-
trines into the takings debate over environmental regulations, fo-
cusing in particular on regulations protecting wetlands and coastal 
barrier beaches. The starting point of the Article is the following 
excerpt from the Court's opinion: 
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land 
of all economically beneficial use, . . . it may resist compensa-
tion only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of 
the owner's estate shows tha.t t4e proscribed use interests were 
not part of his title to begin with,1o 
This Article argues that the Court's reliance on the law of 
property neither creates an internal inconsistency in takings law 
nor necessarily leads to further destruction of natural resources. 
Background principles of property law, such as custom and public 
trust, have long provided a basis for government protection of the 
public's interest in certain types of land, like the barrier beach 
David Lucas sought to develop.11 
Society: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 Mn. L. REV. 162 (1993). And for 
the opinion that the decision will have little if any effect on the constitutionality of 
environmental regulations, see Glenn P. Sugarneli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing, 
12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 439 (1993) [hereinafter Sugarneli, Sound and Fury]. 
8. One takings scholar refers to these common law doctrines as a "title penumbra." 
David J. McCarthy, Jr., Ruminations on Regulation and the Takings Clause, 5 HOME RuLE 
& CIVIL Soc'y 27, 63 (1994). 
9. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings 
Clause, 18 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Humbach, Nuisance]. 
10. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992). 
11. Carol Rose takes this argument one step further, arguing that the concept of 
property includes "a normative 'deep structure'" that includes qualities of restraint and 
responsibility which form the basis of a sound environmental ethic. See Carol M. Rose, 
Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1, 
28 (1994) [hereinafter Rose, Environmental Ethics]; see also infra part III.B. 
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Thus, the Lucas case need not be perceived as casting a con-
stitutional cloud over laws protecting important ecosystems like 
wetlands and barrier beaches.12 The decision may not place these 
resources in greater danger from property rights zealots and the 
courts than the resources were before Lucas. 13 By allowing the 
government to rely on background principles of common law to 
justify regulatory action, the Supreme Court has conceptually ex-
panded the "harmful" or "noxious uses" principle of takings juris-
prudence, 14 giving the principle new vitality. Those who view Lu-
cas as a cataclysmic decision for environmental regulation15 may 
be in danger of reading too much into the creation of a new 
categorical rule based on economic value and too little into the 
exceptions to that rule.16 
12. Notwithstanding this argument that Lucas should not severely restrain federal 
and state regulators from pursuing policies that protect important natural resources like 
wetlands, the resolution of questions left open after Lucas by the Court of Federal Claims 
may well chill such initiatives. The rhetoric of the majority's language, the palpable 
distrust of state legislators and regulators, and the obvious effort in the majority's decision 
to let Lucas win all send strong pro-property rights signals to the lower courts. The 
ultimate application of the Lucas doctrine by the lower courts may be more significant for 
the protection of natural resources. 
The Supreme Court has shown some initial reluctance to review post-Lucas takings 
claims on the merits. See Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 499-502 (discussing 
this and other post-Lucas cases of interest). But see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 
2309 (1994) (holding conditioned approval of permit to expand business in floodplain, 
which required landowner to dedicate public greenway and pedestrian/bicycle pathway, 
unconstitutional as uncompensated taking). In Dolan, the Supreme Court refined the 
Nol/an nexus test to require individualized determinations of "rough proportionality" 
between the regulatory exaction and proposed development's impact. 
13. For an interesting discussion of the ascension of the takings issue on the 
political conservative agenda and how the majority's decision was intended to promote 
that agenda, see Richard Lazarus, Putting the Correct 'Spin' on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. Rnv. 
1411 (1993) [hereinafter Lazarus, Spin]. See also Kenneth Berlin, Just Compensation 
Clause and the Workings of Government: The Threat from the Supreme Court and Possible 
Responses, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 97 (1993) (describing efforts by activist conservative 
legal scholars to use property rights as cornerstone of their attack on activist government) 
[hereinafter Berlin, Just Compensation]; Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 442 
(stating that pro-takings advocates are using takings as back-door administrative, legisla-
tive, and judicial attacks on laws and regulations that cannot be repealed or modified on 
their merits). 
14. For a contrary view, see Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9 (arguing that, after 
Lucas, remedial statutes meant to improve common law could still be subject to preemp-
tion by common law is extraordinary reversal of centuries-old roles). 
15. In the words of Justice Blackmun, "Today the Court launches a missile to kill 
a mouse." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun protested the 
decision as well as "each step taken to reach it." /d. 
16. For a contrary view on the significance of the Court's linking of takings 
jurisprudence to the common law of nuisance, see Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 
23-28. Professor Humbach argues, among other things, that Lucas' shift of the locus for 
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The remainder of this Article lays out the support for this 
thesis. Part II summarizes the regulatory takings doctrine and the 
nuisance principle and outlines both the facts of the Lucas case 
and the Supreme Court's decision. Part III examines the common 
law doctrines of custom and public trust and how, as "background 
principles" of the law of property, they fit within the exception to 
the bright line takings rule created by the Lucas Court. The analy-
sis reveals the vitality and elasticity of these doctrines in state law, 
and how, rather than acting as a limit on state regulatory authority, 
they may enable proscriptive regulatory initiatives, such as those 
protecting wetlands and coastal barrier beaches. Part III concludes 
with a discussion of the applicability of these two common law 
doctrines to barrier beaches and wetlands, drawing theoretical sup-
port from the work of Carol Rose on "inherently public property."17 
Part IV shows how public trust and custom can defeat a tak-
ings claim and explains that this should not destabilize expecta-
tions about property rights. This Article argues that these doctr~nes 
not only accord with public expectations about the use of barrier 
beaches and wetlands, but also help these lands to fulfill certain 
important societal and ecological functions thwarted by current 
understandings of regulatory takings doctrine. Nonetheless, a theo-
retical understanding of the public's superior interest in land pro-
tected by the doctrines of public trust and custom may founder on 
the reality of the landowner's justifiable frustration when her ex-
pectations about the use of her land are not in accord with public 
expectations based on obscure doctrinal principles. In fact, by in-
fusing common law doctrines capable of evolution into the regula-
tory takings formula, the Lucas court has increased the opportuni-
ties for government to frustrate the expectations of private landowners. 
Thus, the Article concludes by cautioning that over-use or misap-
plication of the common law doctrines of custom and public trust 
could jeopardize both these doctrines and the environmental laws 
they help support. 
determining society's tolerance for a given proposed use of land from the legislature to 
the courts is inherently undemocratic and, therefore, wrong. 
17. Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inher-
ently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, Comedy of the 
Commons]. 
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II. REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE THROUGH LUCAS 
The American commitment to property has been "an extremely 
durable ... ideology,"18 stemming in large part from 1ohn Locke's 
seventeenth-century discourse on the origin and nature of civil 
governments.19 .Property has been assigned many roles in American 
society.20 A chief exponent of the sanctity of private property rights, 
Richard Epstein, has argued that property rights are a fundamental 
civil right because of their universality and utility.21 This cry has 
been taken up by property rights activists, who now seek to use 
the takings doctrine to strike down government regulations deM 
signed to protect critical natural areas, such as wetlands, coastal 
barrier beaches, and habitats for endangered species.22 
18. Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of 
Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSP. IN AM. HIST. 331-32 (1971), quoted in 
MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN 
AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1789-1920 20 (1987). 
19. John Locke, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
ToLERATION (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1937) was written between 1685 and 1688. 
According to Selvin and other scholars, Locke's treatise served as the "reference point for 
nineteenth century judicial discourse on the sanctity of private property and on the extent 
of permissible governmental interference with the enjoyment of that property." SELVIN, 
supra note 18, at 20. Another oft-cited reference point is Blackstone's CoMMENTARIES. 
For example: 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the 
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2, quoted in Robert C. Ellickson, Property in 
Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317 (1993). 
20. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) 
(advocating creation of property rights to protect intangibles like government entitle-
ments); see also J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. CoMMENTARY 239 (1990) 
(propounding green theory of property to give legal effect to ecological land ethic and to 
support regulatory program of land use serving ecological ends of removing impediments 
to exercise of public control). 
21. Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 207 ("Given where we are today, we need 
less government and wider spheres of individual autonomy"). But see Carol Rose's 
response to those who question whether the property rights approach enhances the cause 
of individual autonomy, equality and liberty. Rose, Property Rights, supra note 4, at 593 
(claiming property rights approach based on private rights system could result in restric-
tions on land use which could jeopardize some elements of autonomy, equality, and 
liberty). 
22. See Berlin, Just Compensation, supra note 13, at 99 (discussing how conserva-
tive ideologues have invoked the Just Compensation Clause as cornerstone of their attack 
on activist government); see also Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 442. 
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A. A Snapshot of the High- (Low-) Lights of Takings Law 
Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, takings claims 
consisted largely of allegations that the government had taken physi-
cal possession of private property through the exercise of its emi-
nent domain power. 23 The general rule was that no compensation 
need be paid unless the government formally appropriated the prop-
erty, or, at the very least, seized possession of it.24 Between 1871 
and 1922, the application of the takings doctrine radically changed. 
During that period, the Supreme Court handed down three deci-
sions that became the foundation of the modem takings doctrine 
and moved the emphasis away from the requirement of physical 
possession of property by the government. 
The first case to move the takings doctrine beyond its early 
confines was Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 25 In Pumpelly, the Su-
preme Court held that a landowner was entitled to compensation 
when his property was physically invaded by water, earth, and sand 
as a result of the construction of a state-authorized dam by an 
upstream property owner. Although the Court used language which 
presaged more modem cases involving diminution of economic 
value,26 the case has been viewed as establishing the physical oc-
cupation rule in takings law. This rule states that where there has 
been permanent physical occupation of land, the government must 
compensate the landowner, even if the land has not been nominally 
taken or appropriated.27 Courts considered physical invasion as a 
23. According to some scholars, "[t]he most historically settled application of the 
Just Compensation Clause-indeed perhaps the only historically settled application-is the 
requirement that government must pay for property it seizes through an exercise of eminent 
domain." Rubenfeld, Usings, supra note 4, at 1081. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at 49-52 
(discussing the exercise of eminent domain power in the 19th century). . 
24. See Rubenfeld, Usings, supra note 4, at 1083. See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892 
(citing Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871)); Transportation Co. v. 
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897) 
for the same proposition. 
25. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). "It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory 
result . . . if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property . . . . 
[I]t can destroy its value entirely ... without making any compensation, because, in the 
narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use." Id. at 177-78. For other 
early examples of the regulatory takings doctrine, see Washburn, supra note 7, at 165-66 n.22. 
26. "[W]here real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, 
earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to 
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the 
Constitution .... " Pumpelly, SO U.S. (13 Wall.) at 181 (emphasis added). 
27. For a discussion of the difference between physical occupation cases, such as 
8 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 19:1 
per se compensable taking.28 Under this rule, the amount of land 
physically displaced by the government's actions need not be large.29 
The second foundational case in this period was Mugler v. 
Kansas,30 in which the Supreme Court held that the owner of a 
brewery was not entitled to compensation for a state law prohibit-
ing him from manufacturing or selling alcohol. The plaintiff relied 
on Pumpelly to argue that the statute destroyed his beneficial use 
of the brewery property.31 The Court brushed aside this argument, 
not on the traditional ground that Mugler had suffered no invasion 
of his land,32 but because the sole basis of the prohibition law was 
to protect individuals from harm.33 Private property, the Court stated, 
is "held under the implied obligation-that the owner's use of it shall 
not be injurious to the community."34 
Mugler introduced the "harmful" or "noxious use" principle, 
also referred to as the "nuisance exception" to the Just Compensa-
tion Clause.35 This principle sustains government actions designed 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding state law 
requiring building owners to allow cable companies to place cable facilities in their 
buildings per se taking of private property) and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 
(1946) (holding physical interference with air space surrounding property equivalent to 
occupying landowner's property), and physical invasion cases like Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (finding that imposition of navigational servitude on land-
owner's property for public access was compensable taking), see Alison Rieser, Public 
Trust, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 42 ME. L. REv. 5, 14-21 (1990) [hereinafter 
Rieser, Public Trust]. In the latter category of cases, according to Rieser, the courts balance 
public against private interests, as opposed to finding a per se taking. See id. at 14-15. 
28. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. Per se categorical treatment entitles a landowner 
to automatic compensation once he or she has shown that the case fits into the category. 
It also relieves the court from examining on a case by case basis the legitimacy of the 
public interest being advanced in support of the restriction. Jd. 
29. In Loretto, the Supreme Court found displacement of a cubic foot of space on 
the roof of the complainant's building sufficient to hold that a New York statute requiring 
landlords to permit cable companies to install their equipment in rental apartments effected 
an uncompensated taking. The Court stated that "whether the installation is a taking does 
not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a breadbox." 458 
U.S. at 438 n.16. 
30. 123 u.s. 623 (1887). 
31. Jd. at 667. 
32. In Mugler, the plaintiffs argued that regulatory initiatives that destroy the value 
of property require compensation. However, the Supreme Court distinguished Mugler from 
Pumpe/ly by describing Pumpe/ly as involving a "permanent ... physical invasion" and 
a "practical ouster of ... possession." Jd. at 668 (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 
99 u.s. 635, 642 (1878)). 
33. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668. 
34. Jd. at 665. 
35. While Lucas diminishes the significance of the Mug/er line of cases by labelling 
the nuisance principle "simply the progenitor" of more contemporary statements about 
requiring land-use regulations to advance a legitimate state interest in order to justify a 
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to protect the public from harm regardless of the extent of inter-
ference with the landowner's use of his property. After Mugler and 
until Lucas, the nuisance principle had been applied repeatedly to 
sustain a wide variety of regulations, including some that physi-
cally invaded a landowner's property36 and others that severely 
restricted the property's use.37 The Supreme Court has also applied 
the principle to activities that might in and of themselves not be 
considered noxious, but fail the public nuisance test because of the 
particular location in which they occur.38 The analysis by the re-
viewing court in these cases was no more searching than was 
necessary to find a harm-preventing justification for the restric-
tion.39 
taking, it does not completely reject those cases. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. The Court's 
failure to reconcile the historic conflict between Mugler and the economic diminution test 
has drawn from one takings scholar the criticism that it was "spinning" the Lucas opinion 
"with the hope that lower courts will mistake the promise for the delivery and adopt its 
broad language rather than its narrow holding." Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1413. 
36. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (holding that destruction of 
cedar trees that posed threat to nearby orchard is not compensable taking). 
37. See, e.g., Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) 
(holding ordinance barring burials in certain parts of city constitutional); Powell v. 
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (upholding legislation prohibiting manufacture of 
oleomargarine despite allegation of complete economic deprivation); Reiman v. City of 
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (holding that ordinance forbidding operation of livery 
stable in downtown area does not effect compensable taking); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 
U.S. 394 (1915) (sustaining ordinance forbidding operation of brickyard in residential 
area); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding regulation closing 
an operating gravel pit); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (sustaining 
disclosure of confidential data even when company is deprived of all property interests in 
its trade secrets). See also the denial of certiorari in First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (upholding lower court ruling, 258 Cal. 
Rptr. 893 (Cal.App. 1989), that applied the nuisance principle to sustain floodplain 
ordinance causing landowner total economic loss). The majority opinion in Lucas, there-
fore, errs when it says that it could find no case that employed the harmful use prevention 
logic to sustain a regulation that wholly eliminated the value of a claimant's land. Lucas, 
112 S. Ct. at 2899. What is even more puzzling about the Court's treatment of precedent 
on this point is its use ofNollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); and Hodel 
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981) to support 
the proposition that when all economically beneficial or productive use of land has been 
denied, the landowner is treated categorically as having suffered a taking, since none of 
these cases involves total economic or productive loss of property. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 
2893-94. 
38. "Merely a right thing in the wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the 
barnyard." This concept was used to sustain zoning regulations in Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
39. In Lucas, the Supreme Court found the failure by the lower court to conduct a 
more searching review and its tautological reliance on the nuisance principle to be 
reversible error. The Lucas majority rejects "noxious use logic" as a "touchstone to 
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The third, and by far the most controversial, of the three 
cornerstone cases of the modem takings doctrine was Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon.40 In Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court for 
the first time struck down a regulation as an uncompensated taking 
on the sole ground that state law41 had gone "too far" in diminish-
ing the economic value of the landowner's property. 
[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must 
yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation 
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are 
gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is 
the extent of the dimunition. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of 
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. 42 
The decision contributed a third takings test for courts to apply: 
the extent to which the government's action diminished the eco-
nomic value of the landowner's property.43 
Generally referred to as the touchstone of the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine,44 Pennsylvania Coal is perhaps best known for its 
opacity on the precise contours of that doctrine. Holmes' failure to 
define how far was "too far"45 in his economic diminution test 
distinguish regulatory 'takings'-which require compensation-from regulatory depriva-
tions that do not require compensation:• Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. 
40. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For a spirited critique of Justice Holmes' decision, see J. 
Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments For the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 
EcoLOGY L.Q. __ (1994) (at 12-22 in unpublished draft manuscript on file with the 
Harvard EIWironmental Law Review). For additional critical commentary, see Rubenfeld, 
Usings, supra note 4, at 1086-87. 
41. The state statute, the Kohler Act, prohibited the mining of coal beneath the 
property of another in such a way as to cause subsidence damage. See Pennsylvania Coal, 
260 U.S. at 412-13. These rights are called support rights, which grant neighboring owners 
reciprocal easements of support. 
42. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. 
43. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (finding that 
New York City's historical preservation ordinance, which prevented landowner from 
constructing skyscraper on property, does not effect taking because landowner could 
transfer rights to adjacent properties) offered a variation on the diminution test by looking 
not at the extent of loss suffered by the landowner, but at the value of the remaining use 
of the land. 
44. One scholar has referred to Pennsylvania Coal as the "Everest" of takings law. 
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 156 (1977), quoted in 
Rubenfeld,. Usings, supra note 4, at 1086. 
45. One of the issues in Pennsylvania Coal that remains unresolved today is the 
so-called denominator question: what part of the landowner's property should be used as 
the denominator in the takings equation? The Kohler Act left the mining companies with 
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initiated years of judicial struggling46 to produce a workable for-
mula to answer that question. 
Pennsylvania Coal also left unreconciled the conflict between 
the nuisance principle and the new economic diminution or resid-
uum test. For instance, Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal 
raised Mugler and its progeny in defense of the state law,47 but 
Holmes did not even mention Mugler in the majority opinion. 
Fifty-five years later, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis,48 the Court sustained another Pennsylvania statute 
aimed at preventing surface subsidence from coal mining, because 
"Pennsylvania acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant 
threat to the common welfare."49 The Keystone Court, however, 
neither affirmed the Mugler line of cases nor specifically overruled 
Pennsylvania Coal, continuing the confusion begun by Justice Hol-
mes in the latter case.50 The stage was set for David Lucas to try 
no economic value in the below-ground estate. Justice Brandeis, in dissent, argued that 
the whole estate, not just the below-ground estate, should be examined to determine the 
extent of the economic loss suffered by the landowner. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 
at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The debate over the denominator in the takings equation 
continues in the Lucas decision, which concedes that "the rhetorical force of [the Court's] 
'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the 
rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be 
measured." 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. Footnote 7 to Lucas describes Penn Central as an 
"extreme" and "unsupportable view of the relevant calculus," and indicates a willingness 
to revisit the question, casting a cloud over that precedent. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. 
The majority hints that the resolution of the denominator question may also lie in a state's 
common law of property and to what degree the state's common law has recognized and 
protected the particular legal interest which the taking claimant alleges has decreased in 
value. 
See also Thll v. Virginia, 61 U.S.L.W. 3215, 3226 (U.S. October 6, 1992) (describing 
the unpublished Nov. 4, 1991 ruling of the Accomack County Circuit Court as folows: 
"Denial of permit to fill approximately two acres of wetlands that are part of 43-acre site 
that was to be subdivided for use as mobile home sites did not deprive owners of all 
economically viable use of their property, and thus there has been no taking of property 
by inverse condemnation."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992). See also Sugameli, Sound 
and Fury, supra note 7, at 462-84 (discussing post-Lucas cases on this and other points 
of interest). Resolution of the denominator question is of great importance in wetlands 
permit denial cases, since these cases frequently involve only a fraction of the landowner's 
total property ownership. 
46. It has been suggested that this struggle might be "inevitable," given the 
difficulty of "defining the line between valid majoritarian regulatory demands and invalid 
confiscation of individual property rights." ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 457 (1992). 
47. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
48. 480 u.s. 470 (1987). 
49. Id. at 485; see also Rubenfeld, Usings, supra note 4, at 1090 n.91 (noting that 
Justice Stevens labelled bulk of Holmes' decision in Pennsylvania Coal "advisory," in 
order to distinguish that case from Keystone with respect to Mugler nuisance principle). 
50. The Supreme Court in Keystone acknowledged that state law had not caused a 
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to bring these two takings tests together in a way that favored his 
interests. 
B. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci151 
In 1986, David Lucas, a real estate developer, bought two 
undeveloped lots on Isle de Palm, South Carolina. 52 He intended to 
build a home for his family on one lot and to use the second for 
construction of another single-family residence for resale.53 Mr. 
Lucas' plans were interrupted in 1988 by the South Carolina leg-
islature's passage of the Beachfront Management Act.54 This Act 
effectively stopped Lucas from proceeding with his plans by pro-
hibiting development seaward of a setback line. 55 
Lucas elected not to contest the setback line, 56 but immediately 
challenged the Beachfront Management Act in state court.57 He 
total loss of economic viability, since the owner retained significant economic value in the 
non-support parts of the estate unaffected by the law, and so relied on Mug/er to sustain 
the law. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1987). 
While doing so, however, the Supreme Court left standing the conflict between two 
different views of the takings doctrine (economic viability and harm-preventing). 
51. The background facts are drawn from the majority's opinion in Lucas, from 
Justice Blackmon's dissent, and from the amicus curiae Brief in Support of Respondent, 
filed by Nueces County, Texas et al., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 
2886 (1992) (No. 91-453) (copy on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
The author participated in the drafting of that brief. See generally Lazarus, Spin, supra 
note 13. 
52. Isle de Palm, which has been under development since the late 1970s, is a 
barrier island situated eastward of Charleston, South Carolina. During Hurricane Hugo, 
which hit South Carolina particularly hard in 1989, the entire Isle de Palm was flooded. 
Generally, everything on the island within 500 feet of the water, including Lucas' property, 
was either severely damaged or completely destroyed. Herbert S. Saffir, Hurricane Hugo 
and the Implications for Design Professionals and Code-Writing Authorities, 8 J. CoASTAL 
REs. 25, 27 (Special Issue, 1991). 
53. Lucas had been involved in the development of Isle de Palm since the late 
1970s. He paid $975,000 for the two lots. A house had been constructed on the lot between 
his two lots, and there were several houses on other nearby beachfront lots. Lucas, 112 S. 
Ct. at 2887, 2889. 
54. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 48-39-290 (Law. Co-op. 1993). 
55. Prior to passage of the 1988 Beachfront Management Act, Lucas' property had 
been zoned for single-family residential construction. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889. 
56. Under the Act, the South Carolina Coastal Council was directed to establish a 
baseline connecting the landward-most points of erosion on the Isle de Palm during the 
last forty years. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290 (Law. Co-op. 1993). The baseline the 
Council drew for Lucas effectively blocked him from developing his land other than to 
construct nonhabitable improvements like "wooden walkways" and "small wooden docks." 
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90 n.2. 
57. In 1990, the State amended the law to authorize the Coastal Council to issue 
special permits for construction of habitable dwellings seaward of the baseline. S.C. CoDE 
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alleged the Act destroyed all economically viable use of his prop-
erty, and thus worked a compensable taking under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.58 Lucas' position that he was entitled to 
compensation regardless of the Act's alleged "police power" pur-
pose directly challenged the nuisance exception to the Just Com-
pensation Clause. 59 
The state trial court agreed with Lucas and awarded him over 
$1.2 million. 60 The State Supreme Court reversed, 61 finding that the 
nuisance principle applied to the Beachfront Management Act.62 
The State court relied on Mugler v. Kansas63 and its progeny for 
support. 64 The State court did not examine the legislative findings 
in the Beachfront Management Act, because Lucas conceded their 
validity. 65 
ANN. § 48-39-290(0)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1993). Lucas elected not to apply for a special 
permit, but to continue to prosecute his court action. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). The South Carolina Supreme Court declined to dismiss the appeal as 
unripe, because Lucas had not had an opportunity to apply for such a permit, nor had the 
Coastal Council an opportunity to respond to that application. South Carolina Coastal 
Council v. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d 895, 902 n.8 (S.C. 1991); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2891. 
58. Lucas 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90. 
59. Jd. 
60. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890. 
61. Two dissenting State Supreme Court Justices agreed that Mugler precluded the 
finding of a compensable taking if the state law is necessary to protect the public health, 
safety, and welfare, but believed the 1988 Act did not have as its primary purpose the 
prevention of a nuisance or comparable harms. Instead, the dissenters postulated that the 
Act conferred a benefit on the state by creating wildlife habitat and places of natural beauty 
as well as promoting tourism. South Carolina Coastal Council v. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d 895, 
906 (S.C. 1991). The dissenters would have found a taking based on the trial court's 
finding that the lots lacked fair market value and economically viable use, and then would 
have remanded the matter back to the Coastal Council to allow Lucas to apply for special 
permits under the 1990 Amendments. Only if the Council then denied those permits would 
the dissenters have awarded Lucas compensation. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 
S.E.2d at 907-08. 
62. In a companion case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed 
with the South Carolina Supreme Court that the Beachfront Management Act's prohibition 
against the rebuilding of structures between the setback line and the baseline neither 
effected a taking nor worked a due process violation. Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 939 F.2d 165, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992) 
(finding that substantial reduction of property's attractiveness to potential purchasers does 
not establish right to compensation) (citing Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 
1, 15 (1984)). See also Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 403 S.E.2d 620 (S.C. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 185 (1991) (holding denial of permit to build bulkhead not 
taking). 
63. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (holding that prohibiting the sale and manufacture of 
intoxicating liquors did not constitu.te a taking). 
64. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). See, e.g., 
supra notes 36-37. 
65. Lucas did not contest the findings of the State law that construction in the coastal 
zone threatened an important public resource and created a public nuisance. I d. at 898. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.66 The case gener-
ated intense interest67 because it offered the first opportunity since 
the Court's rulings in 198768 for a new pronouncement on takings law.69 
A majority of the Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina 
Supreme Court decision sustaining application of the Beachfront 
Management Act7° to Lucas' property.71 Relying heavily on dicta 
from Agins v. Tiburon,72 the Supreme Court held in Lucas that 
66. 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991). 
67. 1\venty-seven amicus curiae briefs were filed: 16 supporting the petitioner and 
11 supporting the respondent. For a list of those interests that filed amicus briefs, see 
Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 453. There was considerable dissension within 
the federal government over whether the United States should support the Coastal 
Council's regulation, which implemented the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1451-1464 (1972). Although the Solicitor General ultimately filed a brief supporting 
reversal, he rejected a strong pro-takings brief drafted by the Acting Assistant Attorney 
General in response to objections to that draft raised by National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration ("NOAA"), Army Corps of Engineers, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency ("FEMA"), and Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). See responses to Peter 
R. Steenland, Jr., Chief of the Appellate Section of the Environment and Natural Resources 
Division, Department of Justice, from Thomas A. Campbell, General Counsel, NOAA 
(Dec. 5, 1991), William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of the Army (Dec. 20, 
1991), Patricia M. Gramley, General Counsel, FEMA (Dec. 20, 1991); and an internal 
memorandum from Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, Acting General Counsel, EPA, to the EPA 
Administrator (Dec. 20, 1991) (referenced documents on file with the Harvard Environ-
mental Law Review). 
68. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that 
approval of building permit need not depend on owner granting public access); First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) 
(holding temporary deprivations of use to be col!lpensable under Takings Clause); Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (sustaining state law 
prohibiting mining that caused subsidence). 
69. For a list of other takings cases handled by the Court in its 1991-92 Term, see 
supra note 5. 
70. Conservationists have taken some comfort from the fact that the Lucas decision 
did not declare the Beachfront Management Act unconstitutional; the Court merely held 
invalid its application to Lucas' property. 
71. Until Lucas, courts had generally sustained beach setback laws. See, e.g., Gorieb 
v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (holding that ordinance requiring new houses to be set back 
reasonable distance from streets does not violate due process); Esposito v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992) 
(sustaining Beachfront Management Act's prohibition against rebuilding previously de-
stroyed dwellings between setback and base lines); McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 
F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (sustaining oceanfront setback ordinance); Hall v. Board 
of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d 453 (Me. 1987) (sustaining law prohibiting development in 
certain sensitive shoreline areas). For a thorough analysis of these and other state setback 
laws as well as the fate of beach access laws when faced with takings challenges, see 
Amelia T.R. Starr, 'Ruin Hath Taught Me Thus to Ruminate': Rejecting the Regula-
tory/Eminent Domain Dichotomy for Coastal Land, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117, 
138-47 [hereinafter Starr, Coastal Land]. 
72. The principle that land-use regulation that fails to substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land effects a taking 
was introduced as dicta in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); the Lucas 
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persons suffering total economic deprivationn as a result of gov-
ernment regulation are categorically74 entitled to compensation un-
less background common law principles of nuisance or property 
justify the restriction.75 The Court remanded the case for a finding 
majority's elevation of this to the level of a categorical rule immediately generated 
controversy. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992). 
"The Court's suggestion that Agins ... created a new per se rule ... is unpersuasive." 
Id. at 2911 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[O]ur rulings have rejected such an absolute 
position." Id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Agins is generally considered to stand for 
the obverse principle, that the ultimate conclusion in a takings case "necessarily requires 
a weighing of private and public interests." 447 U.S. at 261. 
73. In reaching its decision, the Lucas majority deferred to the trial court's finding 
that' the Act deprived Lucas of all economically viable use of his land. Professor Lazarus 
cites this omission as one of several obstacles (the others being ripeness and standing) the 
majority leapt over in its eagerness to confer a win on Lucas. See Lazarus, Spin, supra 
note 13, at 1418-21. This assumption of total economic ruin generated acerbic comment 
from several of the other Justices, and formed the basis of Justice Souter's statement, in 
which he voted to dismiss the writ for being improvidently granted. See 112 S. Ct. at 2925 
(Souter, J., separate statement); see also id. at 2896 n.9 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 
2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
74. By treating total economic diminution cases categorically, the majority appar-
ently rejected the case-by-case approach which had dominated previous takings jurispru-
dence cases. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("If one fact about 
the Court's taking jurisprudence can be stated without contradiction, it is that 'the 
particular circumstances of each case' determines [sic] whether a specific restriction will 
be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay compensation.") (citations omitted). 
See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("[T]his 
court ... has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and 
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the 
government."); United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 155 (1952) (taking into account the 
context of the government's action when deciding takings case); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) ("[T]his is a question of degree-and therefore cannot 
be disposed of by general propositions."); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 
(1915) (looking at the circumstances of the individual case in evaluating effect of city 
ordinance); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61 ("[N]o precise rule determines when property has 
been taken .... [T]he question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public 
interests."); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657 (1887) (holding that state statute which 
retroactively closed down brewery, thereby depriving owner of use of his property, was 
not unconstitutional). 
On its face, the application of a categorical rule to a takings claim eliminates any 
consideration of the validity of the purpose of the government's restrictive activities. Cf 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (holding that takings case 
"entails inquiry into ... the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, 
and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations"). This use of a per 
se rule to dispose summarily of a second category of takings claims parallels the Court's 
tendencies in other areas of constitutional law, such as the two-tiered strict scrutiny or 
rational basis standard of review it has used in First Amendment, Commerce Clause, Due 
Process, and Equal Protection cases. Under that approach, laws subject to strict scrutiny 
rarely survive the review, while those subject to the (less searching) rational basis test are 
sustained. Perversely, because the circumstances requiring strict scrutiny do not occur 
frequently, just as total takings are rare, the approach results in a reverse presumption, 
with most laws being sustained. This same phenomenon may occur after Lucas as 
well. See Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1427-28, for further exposition of this thought. 
75. The U.S. Supreme Court briefly discussed the issue of whether Lucas' claim 
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on whether South Carolina's common law of nuisance or property 
would bar construction of Lucas' dwellings.76 
The Supreme Court was divided over the use of nuisance as 
the touchstone for determination of a taking. Justice Scalia wrote 
for the majority, which included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White, O'Connor, and Thomas. Justices Blackmun and Stevens 
dissented, and while Justice Kennedy concurred, all three Justices 
found the majority's use of the common law of nuisance "too 
narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex 
and interdependent society."77 Furthermore, Justices Blackmun78 and 
Stevens79 considered the case unripe for the Court to decide. Justice 
Souter, filing a se:parate statement, was disturbed that the district 
was unripe because of the 1990 Amendment to the Beachfront Management Act allowing 
him to apply for a special permit, which he had not done. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 
2890-91. The Court noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision, by reaching 
the merits and not resting its judgment on ripeness grounds, precluded both "practically 
and legally" any temporary takings claim by Lucas for the economic losses he suffered 
prior to the statutory amendment. ld. at 2888. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court identified as a separate issue the question of whether the remand created a cause of 
action for Lucas for the temporary taking of his property. See Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). 
76. The majority noted that "[i]t seems unlikely that common-law principles would 
have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's 
land [because they] rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land." Lucas, 112 
S. Ct. at 2901 (citations omitted). But see Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1424 
(misconception of essential uses). 
77. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that the common law of nuisance may accord with most expectations of 
property owners who face regulation, he felt that coastal property may present "such 
unique concerns for a fragile land system" that the state could exceed the bounds of the 
common law of nuisance. !d. 
78. Justice Blackmun argued that: (1) the 1990 Amendment to the Beachfront 
Management Act authorizing special permits meant Lucas had not suffered a taking; 
(2) any temporary taking claim Lucas might have had was barred by his failure to exhaust 
his administrative remedies; and (3) there was no evidence in the record to support the 
trial court's finding that Lucas' property had lost all value. !d. at 2907-08 (B1ackmun, J., 
dissenting). Blackmun also objected to the breadth of the Court's decision in a very narrow 
case. !d. at 2904. He criticized the majority opinion for altering "long-settled rules of 
review" by not deferring to the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision to accept the 
unchallenged judgment of its state legislature. !d. at 2909. Blackmun also opposed the 
majority's decision to place on states the burden of convincing courts that legislative 
judgments are correct. !d. at 2909. 
79. Justice Stevens commented on the absence in the record of any evidence of 
injury-in-fact, which would entitle Lucas to even a temporary takings claim. In particular, 
Stevens noted that Lucas had acquired his property eighteen months before the state Beach 
Management Act was passed, and there was no evidence he had ever applied for a permit. 
!d. at 2917-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens bemoaned the majority's failure 
to avoid the "premature adjudication" of an important constitutional question. !d. at 2917. 
He objected to the "illogical" expansion of the concept of regulatory takings. !d. He also 
argued, as did Justice Blackmun, that takings jurisprudence does not support the majority's 
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court's finding that Lucas had been deprived of all economic inter-
est in his land had not been reviewed by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, and was possibly in error.80 None of the four Justices 
addressed the appropriateness of the majority's reference to "back-
ground principles of the State's law of property."81 
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the State Supreme 
Court for a ruling on whether, as a matter of state law, common 
law principles of nuisance or property would have prevented the 
construction of David Lucas' houses.82 The South Carolina Su-
preme Court ruled that such principles would not bar the construc-
tion, 83 found that the Beachfront Management Act resulted in a 
temporary taking of Lucas' property, and further remanded the case 
for a trial on the issue of the "actual damages" suffered by Lucas 
for the "temporary nonacquisitory taking [of his property]."84 The 
issue of damages never reached a jury trial, as the State settled 
with Lucas for $1.5 million. 85 
The next part of this Article addresses those common law 
principles that the South Carolina State Supreme Court considered 
in concluding that Lucas was entitled to compensation. 
new categorical rule, and dismissed Agins as dicta which had not been followed in the 
Court's rulings before Lucas. Id. at 2917-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2911 
n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
80. Id. at 2925 (Souter, J., statement). 
81. Id. at 2900. 
82. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02. 
83. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). 
According to one of the Coastal Council lawyers, there was never an opportunity for a 
full briefing either on the applicability of the nuisance exception to Lucas' situation, or 
on the validity of the trial court's factual finqing of complete loss of economic value, 
because of the accelerated pace at which the State court conducted the remand. See 
Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1413 n.14. 
84. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). The 
South Carolina State Supreme Court held that Lucas had suffered a temporary taking 
commencing with the enactment of the 1988 Act through November 20, 1992, the date of 
the court order. The South Carolina court also noted that Lucas could apply for a special 
permit, equivalent to a variance or exemption from the statutory probition, which could, 
if denied by the Coastal Council, trigger a second takings challenge by Lucas. ld. 
85. In a bizarre twist to the story, after the settlement in which South Carolina 
compensated Lucas for the land, the Coastal Council announced its intent to sell the lots 
for development, saying "with a house to either side and in between the lots, it is 
reasonable and prudent to allow houses to be built." See H. Jane Lehman, Accord Ends 
Fight Over Use of Land, WASH. PosT, July 17, 1993, at El. 
18 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 19:1 
III. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW OF 
NUISANCE AND PROPERTY 
The background principles of the common law of nuisance and 
property have always been part of takings jurisprudence.86 Yet their 
newfound prominence in regulatory takings jurisprudence, as a 
result of Lucas, has left scholars,87 jurists,88 and state officials89 
concerned about their effect on the ability of state regulators to 
protect the public interest.90 The Luca~ Court's reliance upon com-
mon law doctrines to provide an "exogenous anchor for takings 
law"91 need not be a cause for concern-at least with respect to 
protection of wetlands and barrier beaches.92 
86. As Professor Humbach points out in an article highly critical of Lucas, the common 
law of nuisance has "long been relevant" to takings analysis because "background principles 
of the state's law of ... nuisance shape the contours of constitutional 'title'." Humbach, 
Nuisance, supra note 9, at 7. The same can be said of the common law of property. See 
generally Joseph L. Sax, Rights That "Inhere in the Title Itself": The Impact of the Lucas 
Case on Western Water Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 943 (1993) (advocating that government's 
right to constrain use of property is limited by what it withheld from owners at outset, 
which requires review of historical definition of property) [hereinafter Sax, Western Water]. 
87. See, e.g., Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9. 
88. Justice Stevens complains that the majority's use of common law doctrines 
represents a return to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and will "freeze" state 
common law by depriving state legislatures of their traditional power to revise that law as 
it affects private property rights. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice 
Kennedy finds the common law of nuisance "too narrow a confine for the exercise of 
regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society." Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Justice Blackmun "searches in vain ... for anything resembling a principle 
in the common law of nuisance." /d. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
89. 1\venty-six states, the Territory of Guam, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the South Carolina Coastal Council. California 
also filed a separate brief in support of the Coastal Council specifically addressing its 
concern that it would not be able to protect the public interest if the Supreme Court found 
a taking in Lucas. Brief of Amicus Curiae State of California in Support of Respondent, 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453). 
90. The majority does not explain how its new rule will be applied to a federal 
statute. Given that the U.S. Supreme Court generally has construed federal statutes to oust 
federal common law, Lucas creates the interesting question of whether federal courts will 
be expected to apply state common law principles to federal statutes. See, e.g., Middlesex 
County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that 
complex and comprehensive nature of Clean Water Act and Marine Protection, Research, 
and Sanctuaries Act precludes tenable inference that Congress intended additional extra-
statutory remedies); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981) 
(holding that 1972 Clean Water Act ousted federal common law). Professor Lazarus 
sidesteps this question by assuming the Supreme Court's ripeness rules will require "as 
applied" challenges to be initiated at the state level, or that the federal courts may abstain 
in order to provide state courts with the first opportunity to resolve these issues of state 
law. See Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1430. 
91. Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 10. 
92. There may be other causes for. concern. For example, the Court failed to define 
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This part of the Article examines the Lucas Court's use of the 
nuisance doctrine in its takings analysis, and shows how the astonishing 
modernity of the doctrine93 expands the circumstances in which 
courts may sustain state regulations. 94 The Article then examines 
how various property law principles have historically proscribed· 
certain uses of property, thus preventing such uses from being "part 
of [the] title to begin with."95 
A. The Common Law of Nuisance 
The common law of nuisance provides "[the] frameworks for 
varying the outer contours" of ·an individual's right to use her 
property in certain ways.96 Judges have historically used this ~rame­
work to help them determine whether a particular use is intolerably 
harmful.97 Unfortunately, there may be no more "impenetrable jun-
gle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nui-
sance."'98 Consequently, the doctrine is extremely malleable, espe-
cially at the state court level. 'The Lucas Court's infusion of this 
extremely subjective, fluid doctrine into the law on takings is al-
most counterintuitive, given the Court's apparent desire to make 
takings law more determinate and to limit exceptions to the Just 
Compensation Clause.99 
what constitutes a "reasonable remaining use" of a landowner's property, Lucas, 112 S. 
Ct. at 2894 n.7, which may affect the landowner's ability to show total loss of the 
beneficial use of her property. As a result, the problem of choosing an economic yardstick 
by which to measure the remaining use leaves the lower courts in the same analytic 
quagmire in which they were caught before Lucas. Similarly, the Court's reliance on 
common law principles to create a narrow band of exceptions to its bright line categorical 
rule (that total economic loss effects a taking) may plunge the lower courts into an ad hoc 
search for the contours of that common law doctrine. See Sax, Western Water, supra note 
86. 
93. The majority in Lucas illustrates the modem application of the nuisance doctrine 
by discussing a nuclear power plant sited on an earthquake fault. This example defines the 
reference to prohibitions that "inhere in the title itself." 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01. 
94. For a contrary view of the nuisance doctrine and its application by the Court in 
Lucas, see Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9. 
95. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. 
96. Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 11. 
97. See id. 
98. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 616 
(5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 n.19 (Blackmun, 
J ., dissenting). 
99. The Court tried to control the leeway it feared it had given lower courts in 
interpreting state common law principles by warning in a clarifying footnote, "[A]n 
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According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a landowner 
commits a nuisance when the use of her property interferes 
substantially with the reasonable use, enjoyment, or value of 
another landowner's property.100 Whether a particular activity cre-
ates a nuisance depends upon the seriousness of the harm it could 
cause to adjacent property or to the public at large,101 the social 
value102 of the landowner's activities, 103 the location and surround-
ings of the activity (i.e., the context within which the activity 
occurred), 104 and the relative ease with which the harm can be 
avoided through measures taken by the landowner, the government, 
or the adjacent property owner.105 Nuisance doctrine draws upon 
the maxim "sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas"-"one should 
use her own property in such a manner as not to injure the inter-
ests of others." 
The nuisance doctrine's malleability results from the multi-
factored balancing process106 judges employ to determine which 
harms to prohibit and which to permit. The balance of utilities 
shifts over time to reflect changing mores and expectations about 
affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be defended only if 
an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial 
uses in the circumstances in which the land is presently found." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902 
n.18 (emphasis in original). But see Lazarus, Spin, supra note 13, at 1430 (stating that it 
is unlikely either that state courts will find their own application of precedents unreason-
able or that federal courts will second-guess state judicial counterparts). 
100. RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 821F, 822A, 826 (1977). The 
harms inflicted on that second landowner must be "significant" and "unreasonable" to 
constitute nuisance. !d. 
101. Id. at §§ 826, 827. 
102. The majority's failure to consider Lucas' construction of a house, in most 
circumstances a benign activity, to be a nuisance in its proposed location may be another 
indication of the Court's belief in the social value of development of real property, and 
its eagerness to give it heightened constitutional protection. See Lazarus, Spin, supra note 
13, at 1421-25. 
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1977). 
104. "[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a building 
of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether a particular thing is 
a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the 
thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the 
locality." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). See also Thomas Cusak 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1916) (upholding municipal ordinance regulating 
erection and maintenance of billboards in residential districts); Reinman v. City of Little 
Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (sustaining reversal of Chancery Court decree enjoining 
enforcement of municipal ordinance forbidding livery stable within designated area); 
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (sustaining building commissioner's denial of permit 
where proposed building's height exceeded that allowed under local ordinance). 
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827E, 828C, 830 (1977). 
106. See Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 10. 
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personal conduct, 107 thereby forcing the doctrine to change and 
evolve.108 Nuisance, therefore, is anything but a certain, objective, 
static doctrine, 109 since it depends upon a judge's determination at 
a given point in time of the acceptability of consequences arising 
out of otherwise nonprohibited conduct. no 
Although nuisance is a common law concept, it is affected by 
the legislature through its role in defining public welfare. In Legis-
lators, especially in the environmental arena, are responsible for 
107. See id. at 11 ("common law of private nuisance is not a defined catalogue of 
noxious, reprehensible or even merely forbidden behavior, but is instead an essentially 
relativistic concept."). 
108. Even the majority recognized that the nuisance doctrine is in essence evolu-
tionary. "The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated 
owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition (although changed 
circumstances, or new knowledge may make what was previously pennissible no longer 
so)." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 827 cmt. g 
(1977)) (emphasis added). 
109. One of the ambiguities of the Lucas opinion, as Professor Sax points out, is 
the time at which the restriction on use "inheres in the title." Sax, Western Water, supra 
note 86, at 944 n.8. Given the two very modern examples used by the Court (placing fill 
in a lake that causes flooding of others' land and siting a nuclear power plant over an 
earthquake fault) to illustrate when a landowner might not be entitled to compensation in 
the face of a prescriptive regulatory action (Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01) and its reliance 
on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901), the Court appears 
to employ a functional or expectational rather than a historical definition of nuisance. If 
that supposition is correct, then a court, consistent with Lucas, could judge a landowner's 
conduct according to the nuisance doctrine in effect at the time the state sought to regulate 
that conduct. Compare this result with Professor Sax's view that the tone and rhetoric of 
the Lucas opinion, at least with respect to the Court's use of background principles of 
property, "seems deliberately calculated to cut off arguments that changing times create 
changing needs and with them the changing (diminished) expectations that property 
owners must internalize." Sax, Western Water, supra note 86, at 945. But see Richard C. 
Ausness, Wild Dunes and Serbonian Bogs: The Impact of the Lucas Decision on Shoreline 
Protection Programs, 10 DENY. U. L. REv. 437, 466 (1993) (Courts have institutional 
advantage over legislatures in determining existing nuisance and property law. Legislatures 
represent narrow special interests, while courts are experienced in dealing with legal 
concepts and more likely to be neutral decision-makers. Hence, background principles of 
nuisance and property law are free to change over time as they have always done in the 
past.). [hereinafter Ausness, Wild Dunes]. 
110. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("A nuisance may be 
merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the 
barnyard."). 
111. See Berlin, Just Compensation, supra note 13 (arguing that Lucas denigrates 
role of legislators in making findings about public welfare). But see Lazarus, Spin, supra 
note 13, at 1426-27 (arguing that majority's intimations that background principles must 
be supplied by judge-made common law and not by legislative or regulatory initiatives 
will not survive review in future because of Court's changing composition). See also 
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Status Report, 7 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 139, 150 (1988) (arguing that the only way to bring about more than 
peripheral change in the status of property rights is for Court to order legislatures to get 
out of the business of legislating) [hereinafter Sax, Property Rights]. 
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filling numerous gaps in the common law.112 Indeed, both the leg-
islatures and the courts have played major roles in expanding the 
reach of common law nuisance, particularly with respect to protec-
tion of the environment and natural resources. 113 Moreover, on the 
policy-making side, the courts have frequently led the way for 
legislatures, particularly in environmental decisions. 114 
State courts have historically expanded the class of activities 
covered by nuisance law in response to changing values and pri-
orities.115 The passage of environmental statutes and regulations has 
112. Legislation has filled the gaps in common law in order to protect endangered 
species, Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988), wetlands, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344 (1988), and fragile coastal areas, Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 
(1988). 
113. While Lucas has clearly enhanced the role of the courts and judge-made 
common law in the takings equation, it has not ousted legislators from the process. The 
very nature of nuisance law and its development shows an interplay between the legislature 
and the courts. One commentator has described this interplay as a "functional dialogue." 
Memorandum from Professor Zygmunt Plater, Boston College Law School, to Cotton 
Harness, General Counsel, South Carolina Coastal Council4 (Nov. 14, 1992) (on file with 
the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Given the importance of this dialogue, and the 
way in which Lucas has focused on its results in takings jurisprudence, one would expect 
both the dialogue and the role of legislatures in defining nuisance law to continue. 
114. Courts occasionally display greater sympathy to the inchoate values of natural 
resources and are willing to accord deference to the expert agencies charged with 
protecting them. Compare Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (holding 
that a landowner has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential character of 
her land by using it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state) and Marks 
v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (en bane) (recognizing public trust easement for 
purpose of preserving land in natural state) with S. 177, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (bill 
to codify Executive Order 12,630 requiring federal agencies to perform takings analysis 
of all regulatory initiatives) and H.R. 1330, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (bill providing, 
among other things, for automatic compensation of any owner of wetlands that have been 
classified as bearing critical significance to long-term conservation of the surrounding 
ecosystem). See also Sugameli, Sound and Fury, supra note 7, at 448 n.42 (state takings 
legislation). Courts also are not held hostage by special interests like legislatures are. See 
Epstein, Seven Deadly Sins, supra note 7, at 958-59 (arguing that requiring legislation to 
pass two hurdles is a welcome institutional barrier to special interest legislation, and that 
the imperfection of politics provides strong reason to put aside deference to legislators). 
For general polemics against the democratic branch of government, see Ausness, Wild 
Dunes, supra note 109, at 466 (arguing that courts have institutional advantage over 
legislatures in determining existing nuisance and property law: legislatures represent 
narrow special interests while courts are experienced in dealing with legal concepts and 
more likely to be neutral decision-makers). For a more neutral view, see Daniel A. Farber 
& Paul P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the 
New Public Law, 89 MicH. L. REv. 875, 905-06 (1991) (explaining that legislatures may 
be more legitimate in theory and capable in practice of defining public values than judges, 
but institutional insulation of judges and deliberative qualities stressed by republicanism 
empower common law judges to promote legal change in pursuit of public values). 
115. See Richard Lazarns, Changing Concepts of Property and Sovereignty in 
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 660-61 
(1986) (arguing that substantive scope of both public and private nuisance law has 
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not diminished the relevancy of the doctrine. For example, courts 
have on various occasions required defendants to pay damages for 
air pollution, 116 abate water pollution, 117 stop discharging raw sew-
age into a body of water, 118 pay the cleanup costs of a permitted 
hazardous waste dump site, 119 abate exposure to toxic chemicals, 120 
force the relocation of a feedlot, 121 provide for the private mainte-
nance of a public road to control dust from coal haul trucks, 122 pay 
damages for contamination of well water, 123 and pay punitive dam-
ages for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos more than forty 
years earlier.124 Courts have also used nuisance law to hold defen-
dants liable for causing aesthetic harm by requiring the removal of 
an "unsightly eyesore" from a wooded mountain area. 125 One court 
has even held the United States government liable for failing to 
protect residents from the adverse effects of exposure to radioac-
tive fallout from bomb tests. 126 
In short, nuisance is a vibrant common law doctrine which has 
been and continues to be used to protect land from harmful devel-
opment. 
There is simply no common law doctrine that approaches 
nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land 
willingly embraced environmental and natural resource concerns) [hereinafter Lazarus, 
Changing Concepts]. 
116. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
117. See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921). 
118. Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 816 (Wash. 1984). 
119. New York v. Schenectady Chern. Co., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1983). 
120. Wood v. Picallo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982). 
121. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (holding 
that maintenance of animal feedlot creates public nuisance entitling plaintiff to injunctive 
relief). 
122. West v. National Mines, 285 S.E.2d 670 (W.Va. 1981), discussed in Gene W. 
Bailey II, Case Comment, West v. National Mines: Creation of Private Nuisance By Use 
of Public Property, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 263 (1983). 
123. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) (awarding 
damages for contamination of culinary water wells by defendant's percolating oil well 
formation water); see also Langan v. Valicopters, 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (awarding 
damages to organic farmer for loss of certification due to drifting of aerial pesticide spray). 
124. Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986). 
125. Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that 
obnoxious debris, including stockpiled old cars, scrap metal, oil drums, and general litter, 
is actionable under nuisance theory). For an interesting discussion of traditional common 
law nuisance and its applicability to aesthetic harm, see Stephen Woodbury, Aesthetic 
Nuisance: The Time Has Come to Recognize It, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 877, 878 (1987) 
[hereinafter Woodbury, Aesthetic Nuisance]. 
126. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984). 
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use and of technological abuse. Nuisance actions have involved 
pollution of all physical media-air, water, land-by a wide 
variety of means .... Nuisance actions have challenged virtu-
ally every major industrial and municipal activity which is 
today the subject of comprehensive environmental regulation-
the operation of land fills, incinerators, sewage treatment facili-
ties, activities at chemical plants, aluminum, lead and copper 
smelters, oil refineries, pulp mills, rendering plants, quarries 
and mines, textile mills and a host of other manufacturing 
activities .... Nuisance theory and case law is [sic] the com-
mon law backbone of modern environmental and energy law. 127 
Development is particularly harmful to barrier beaches and 
wetlands because, from an ecological perspective, both types of 
resources have their greatest value when left in their natural state. 
They are also among this country's most economically important128 
and fragile natural systems.129 Their protection benefits society as 
a whole130 both in terms of revenues realized and costs averted.131 
Allowing their destruction leads to public injury, usually in the 
127. WILLIAM RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 100 
(1977), quoted in Woodbury, Aesthetic Nuisance, supra note 125, at 877 n.2. 
128. The importance of coastal beach dune systems was recognized by the South 
Carolina legislature in the Beachfront Management Act. The "beach/dune system along 
the coast of South Carolina is extremely important to the people of the state." Beachfront 
Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). In support of 
this conclusion, the state statute lists the functions that these systems provide for the state, 
such as protecting life and property by functioning as a storm barrier to dissipate wave 
energy, contributing revenue to the state's tourism industry, and providing habitat for 
numerous species of plants and animals and a healthful environment for the state's citizens. 
!d. 
129. Beaches are particularly fragile ecosystems subject to the erosive force of 
ocean tides and waves and energy storms. See generally amicus curiae Brief in Support 
of Respondent, filed by Nueces County, Texas et al. at 4-11, Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453), and sources cited therein (copy on 
file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Coastal erosion and migration has 
become even more pronounced and volatile as a result of sea level rise. See OFFICE OF 
WETLAND PROTECTION, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 
EPA-230-05-86-013, GREENHOUSE EFFECT, SEA LEVEL RISE, AND COASTAL WETLANDS 
(James G. Titus ed., 1988); JOHN R. CLARK, THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, COASTAL 
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: A ThCHNICAL MANUAL FOR THE CONSERVATION OF COASTAL 
ZONE RESOURCES (1977); see also GEOPHYSICS STUDY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL RESEARCH 
CouNCIL, SEA LEVEL CHANGE 4 (1990) (predicting that "[o]ne hundred years from now 
it is likely that sea level will be [1.6 to 3.3 feet] higher than it is at present."). 
130. The more people who engage in a commercial activity, the greater the 
opportunities for all to benefit, and the greater the scale returns. See Rose, Comedy of the 
Commons, supra note 17, at 774. The greatest value of these resources, therefore, is 
realized by society as a whole because of the opportunity for many individuals to benefit 
from them. 
131. Wetlands perform valuable socioeconomic services which are lost when they 
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form of lost benefits.132 Therefore, much of the value of coastal and 
wetlands resources lies in the commercial value of the functions 
they perform. 133 
The essence of the evolution of the nuisance doctrine is to 
respond to "changed circumstances or new knowledge [which] may 
make what was previously permissible no longer so."134 As courts 
continue to apply the nuisance doctrine expansively, 135 its utility 
and appeal to state regulators will increase as well. Thus, nuisance 
law, far from being a limitation on state regulatory action as the 
Lucas Court intended,l36 may instead be a source of enabling author-
ity for state legislatures and regulatory agencies. Indeed, because 
are converted to some other use. Wetlands function as the "farmlands" of the aquatic 
environment and as important wintering-over habitat and feeding grounds. Hope M. 
Babcock, Federal Wetlands Regulatory Policy: Up to its Ears in Alligators, 8 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REv. 307, 309 (1991) (citing RALPH W. TINER, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERiOR, 
WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS 13-27 
(1984)). Further beneficial properties are mairttenance of water quality, erosion control, 
discharge and recharge of ground water, and flood and storm surge damage control. Id. 
Wetland plants form the base of the food chain, supporting higher consumers such as 
commercially and recreationally important species of fish and wildlife. Id. The harvest of 
indigenous products such as timber, fish, shellfish, peat, cranberries, and wild rice, as well 
as recreational opportunities associated with bird watching, canoeing, hunting, and fishing, 
contributed $25 billion to the economy in 1991, according to a recent report published by 
the National Audubon Society. NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY, VALUING WETLANDS: THE 
COST OF DESTROYING AMERiCA'S WETLANDS 29 (Deanne Kloepfer ed., 1994). When 
indirect and induced economic impacts are included, that figure rises to more than 
$72 billion, supporting almost 1 million jobs. Jd. The National Marine Fisheries Service 
estimated in 1983 that annual fishery loss due to estuarine wetland destruction was 
approximately $208 million. RALPH W. TINER, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERiOR, WET-
LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS 36 (1984). For a 
general discussion of wetland values, see id. at 13-25. 
132. Conversion of wetlands or barrier beaches to private use or destruction of their 
natural functions means not only the loss of these valuable public functions, but also a 
reduction in returns of scale. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 768. 
133. For a general discussion of coastal habitat values, see NATIONAL COALITION 
FOR MARlNE CONSERVATION, STEMMING THE TIDE OF COASTAL FISH HABITAT Loss: 
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM ON CONSERVATION OF COASTAL FISH HABITAT (Richard 
H. Stroud ed., 1992) [hereinafter STEMMING THE TIDE]. For a discussion of wetland values, 
see supra note 131. For a discussion on the difficulty of mitigating wetland losses by 
restoring damaged wetlands or creating new wetlands, see Babcock, supra note 131, at 
333. 
134. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992). 
135. Lazarus, in his comprehensive article on the public trust doctrine, discusses 
gradual judicial elimination of restrictions on the use of the public nuisance doctrine: for 
example, no longer limiting its use to the attorney general; no longer requiring citizens to 
show special injury in order to maintain a public nuisance action; and f~eeing the doctrine 
from its limiting relationship to property law concepts and terminology. He concludes that 
this evolution makes the nuisance doctrine an attractive alternative to the public trust 
doctrine discussed at infra part lli.B. See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, 
at 661-64. 
136. See Sax, Western Water, supra note 86, at 944 (arguing that use of nuisance 
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the common law of nuisance is not static, 137 it provides a growing, 
not shrinking, opportunity for regulatory authorities to protect the 
nation's coastlines and wetland resources. 138 
B. Background Principles of Property: A Look at the Common 
Law Doctrines of Custom and Public Trust 
The Lucas Court exempted from the new takings rule uses 
proscribed by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law."139 Most of the Lucas major-
ity opinion focuses on the uses proscribed by state nuisance law. 
Little attention has been paid to a further source of guidance: state 
property law. 140 The Lucas opinion sheds no light on what back-
ground property principles the Court had in mind and whether 
those principles can support preserving land in its natural state. 
This Article suggests that there are useful principles, like the 
maxim sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas, 141 endogenous to the 
concept of property, that can be used to protect natural areas by 
doctrine will lead to more compensation because relatively few things are traditionally 
categorized as nuisances); cf. Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 3 ("After Lucas, ..• 
remedial statutes to improve the common law will now be subject to preemption by the 
common law," in an "extraordinary reversal of centuries-old roles"). 
137. "It is an area of the law that 'straddles the legal universe, virtually defies 
synthesis, and generates case law to suit every taste."' Lucas, I 12 S. Ct. at 2914 n.19 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.4, 
at 48 (1986)) (footnotes omitted). 
138. Illustrating the point that the common law doctrine of nuisance is not static, 
the Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. said: 
Such regulations are sustaineq, under the complex conditions of our day, for 
reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the 
advent of automobiles and rapid transmit street railways, would have been 
condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no 
inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, 
the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and 
different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their 
operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise. 
272 u.s. 365, 387 (1926). 
139. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. 
140. One exception to this is a recent article by Joseph L. Sax. Sax, Western Water, 
supra note 86, at 944, 951 (arguing that definitional/historical view of property rights 
which encompasses doctrines like public trust, may lead in a direction that the Court did 
not intend to go, sustaining governrnent programs that diminish or abolish property rights 
in water). · 
141. "One should use her own property in such a manner as not to injure the 
interests of others." 
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restraining the behavior of private landowners.142 Deconstruction of 
the concept of property may be a useful starting point for exploring 
the restraints on landowner behavior. 
Although there is debate over whether the right to acquire, 
use, and transfer property is considered a natural, 143 fundamentaP44 
or civil right,145 few would argue that the right is limitless.146 Nui-
sance is one conceptual framework for defining restrictions on 
property rights; the concept of property is another. 
Restrictions upon use and alienation of real property flow from 
a perceived need-to avoid waste. Unlike most chattels, real property 
will outlast generations of owners. Professor Richard Epstein, an 
advocate of otherwise unrestricted property rights, argues that prop-
erty is a fundamental civil right with clear and commonly under-
stood rules.147 He recognizes a variety of "sensible legal adaptions" 
142. For a somewhat contrary view, see Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the 
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. 
REV 1433, 1441 (1993) (explaining that background principles of nuisance and property 
law do not include prescriptions requiring landowners to maintain property's natural 
conditions) [hereinafter Sax, Understanding Lucas]. 
143. See John Clough's discussion on whether John Locke's Of Property supports 
the position that the right to accumulate property is a natural right. JoHN H. CLoUGH, 
PROPERTY: ILLUSIONS OF "OWNERSHIP" 17-18 (1984) (citing JOHN LOCKE, 1\vo 'TREATISES 
OF GOVERNMENT 327-44 (Mentor ed., 1963). 
144. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*138-39 (1882), quoted in JOHN H. CLOUGH, PROPERTY: ILLUSIONS OF OWNERSHIP 29-30 
n.4 (1984): 
The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: 
which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, 
without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land .... So 
great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not 
authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the 
whole community. 
145. See Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 188 (arguing that property rights, 
regardless of their diversity, share two indicia of fundamental rights: universality and 
utility). 
146. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at 30 ("But though property be thus protected, it 
is still to be understood, that the lawgiver has a right to prescribe the mode and manner 
of using it, so far as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the right, to the injury or 
annoyance of others, or of the public.") (quoting JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 276 (0. Halsted ed., 1889). 
147. Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 190-93; see also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE 
OF HUMAN NATURE 497 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888) ("Property must be stable, and must 
be fix'd by general rules."), quoted in Epstein, Seven Deadly Sins, supra note 7, at 976 
n.81. For a view of the rules of property as more malleable, see Sax, Understanding Lucas, 
supra note 142, at 1446 (property definitions continuously adjust to reflect new economic 
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of these standard rules to avoid negative externalities and waste. 148 
Each of these adaptions embodies a restraint on a landowner's 
freedom to exercise her proprietary rights; 149 each also acts indi-
rectly to protect resources from either physical destruction or over-
consumption. 
Epstein describes several examples of this type of adapta-
tion-among them, laws preventing landowners from causing sub-
sidence of neighboring property, 150 rules in communal agricultural 
societies that limit both membership in the society and the prac-
tices of members in the commons, 151 and oil and gas pooling sys-
tems152 which require restrictions on private property use, such as 
well-spacing regulations or unitization153 systems. He also recog-
nizes the wisdom of the American West's complex system of water 
rights, which embodies a mix of private and collective restrictions, 
entitlements, and understandings at odds with traditional rules of 
private property ownership.154 
A second source of restraints on the behavior of private land-
owners may lie in the realm of ethics. According to Professor Carol 
Rose, the concept of property includes "a normative 'deep struc-
ture"' that embraces "the qualities of restraint and responsibil-
ity." 155 Such environmental ethics can yield approaches to resource 
management that supplement or replace those of private property 
rights or bureaucratic authority. 156 Rose describes how legal holders 
and social structures to disadvantage of existing owners). See also Alison Rieser, Ecologi-
cal Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 
15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 393 (1991) (state courts' interpretations of public trust doctrine 
identify governmental duties to redefine existing private property rights where such rights 
threaten ecological values of natural areas) [hereinafter Rieser, Ecological Preservation]. 
148. Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 188. 
149. See id. But Epstein has expressed contradictory views about whether property 
rules should be changed to accommodate environmental concerns. Cf. Epstein, Seven 
Deadly Sins, supra note 7, at 976 (arguing that permanence, stability, and certainty are all 
regarded as virtues of a system of property rights, and should not be compromised on 
account of environmental issues). 
150. Epstein, Property, supra note 3, at 195. 
151. Id. 
152. Epstein notes that virtually all systems of private property use a rule of first 
possession to assign particular things to particular individuals. See id. at 190. Pooling 
systems modify this rule substantially. Id. at 195-97. 
153. A system under which individual owners of oil drilling rights pool their 
individual resources and agree to a system of collective management that limits the amount 
of drilling any individual owner can do on her own property. I d. 
154. See id. at 195-97. 
155. Rose, Environmental Ethics, supra note 11, at 28. 
156. Id. at 7-14. 
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of property rights devise various artifices to limit individual uses 
of common property, such as fishing norms or "stinting"157 of live-
stock. These limits are enforced by customs and norms, and have 
been adopted by common law courts.158 In fact, entire bodies of 
common-property law have come to revolve around an ethic of 
"moderation, proportionality, prudence, and responsibility" toward 
others who are entitled to share in common resources. 159 Individual 
property rights embody these same normative characteristics.160 
A third source of restraint on landowner conduct may reside 
in the communities that depend on the property. Professor Joseph 
Sax argues that this dependence reflects the fact that certain types 
of land fulfill important public functions. He describes several 
historical examples of private property being limited by some pub-
lic claim or servitude, such as the requirement that land in frontier 
settlements be put to productive use within a reasonable time. 161 
Such requirements advance the community's interests in that prop-
erty. Professor Sax suggests a usufructuary model of property as a 
means of understanding and effectuating those rights.162 
All three scholars show that the concept of property contains 
generally accepted restraints on the rights of landowners to alter 
their property's physical integrity.163 To Epstein, these restraints 
may originate in the rational desire of landowners to avoid waste 
and negative externalities; to Rose, they are found in the normative 
structure inherent in the concept of property; to Sax, they lie in 
some superior claim to the land held by the public. 
157. A practice, which Rose characterizes as both "widespread" and "long-lived," 
under which individuals limit their use of common property so that the collective uses do 
not destroy the whole. ld. at 26-27. 
158. See id. 
159. ld. at 27. 
160. See id. at 27-28 (theorizing that individual property-holders rely on the 
recognition and acquiescence of others, and that property law assumes neighborliness and 
attentiveness to needs of others in use of one's own exclusive property). 
161. See Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1453. 
162. See id. at 1452-54. 
163. The examples used by Epstein, Rose, and Sax concern individual property 
holders seeking to use a natural resource. Possession (and the concurrent right to exclude 
others) is sought. Restraints must be placed on the possessory and usufructuary rights of 
these individuals to avoid waste, negative externalities and antisocial behavior. This Article 
examines public rights as a source of restraint on private behavior and to what extent the 
public can gain access to private property. For a look at the rights and interests of the 
"unorganized public," and the extent to which those rights or interests restrain the behavior 
of private property holders, see Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17. 
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However, none of the three addresses the question of whether 
a landowner can be compelled to leave her property in its natural 
state. Under their respective views of property, a landowner could 
deplete significantly (perhaps completely) the resource value of her 
land so long as it does not cause waste, violate normative stand~ 
ards, or conflict with some other community need. Sax's ecological 
view of property may come the closest, by showing that land in its 
unaltered state is performing important public services.164 He sug~ 
gests a complete re-altering of property law in response to this 
concern. 165 
Perhaps a more modest proposal might involve finding whether 
property law in its current form can be used to prevent a landowner 
from altering her land's natural condition because of the important 
public services the land may offer. To answer that question, we 
turn to an examination of two specific common law property doc-
trines: custom and public trust. 
1. The Common Law Doctrine of Customi66 
A variety of common law doctrines have been employed over 
time to prevent the conversion of public land to private use, or, 
alternatively, to allow public access to private land.167 Similarly, 
these doctrines could be used to support government regulations 
164. Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note_142, at 1442. 
165. Sax favors establishing a system .of usufructuary rights that subjects private 
ownership to "some public claim or servitude" in order to bring the transformative 
economy into greater harmony with an ecological perspective and the economy of nature. 
See id. at 1452-55. 
166. For a thorough and illuminating discussion of the origins and reach of the 
common law doctrine of custom, see Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 
758-61, 766-71. See also Andrea C. Loux, Note, The Persistence of the Ancient Regime: 
Custom, Utility, and the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 19 CoRNELL L. REV. 
183 (1993) [hereinafter Loux, Ancient Regime]. 
167. Other common law doctrines traditionally used to support public claims of 
access to roads and waterways are prescription (actual, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse 
use under claim of right for period of time prescribed by law), implied dedication (from 
regular use of property by public in reliance on owner's acquiescence in use), adverse 
possession (continuous, open, notorious, hostile, and exclusive use of property of another), 
and public trust. See generally Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 723-27. 
The federal navigational servitude "permits the federal government to displace or 
destroy state-recognized property rights in navigable waters ... without having to pay 
compensation." Joseph L. Sax & Robert H. Abrams, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RE-
SOURCES 96 (1986), quoted in David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: 
A Call For Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest in [Jnvironmentally Critical 
Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 360 (1988) [hereinafter Hunter, Ecological 
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restricting destruction of that land. The ancient doctrine of custom 
has intriguing possibilities in this context. 168 Although the doctrine 
of custom traditionally has been used in the United States only to 
gain public access to coastal resources, such as barrier beaches, its 
historic uses outside of the United States have been broader. Un-
fortunately, constraints inherent in the doctrine and its lack of 
widespread acceptance may limit it to a "background principle" of 
only narrow utility in but a few jurisdictions. 
Customary claims originated in early English law, 169 which 
enabled residents of specific localities170 to claim the rights to use 
a variety of land held in common as "customs of the manor."171 To 
qualify as a customary right, the custom must have existed without 
dispute for a time that ran beyond memory, and had to be both 
well-defined and "reasonable."172 Uses subject to ancient customary 
rights included manorial tenants' rights to graze animals, gather 
wood, cut turf on the manor commons, and engage in a variety of 
recreational activities.173 Other customary rights recognized by Eng-
lish common law courts included market and water rights.174 
Perspective]. But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that 
navigational servitude does not shield federal government from Fifth Amendment). 
168. The judicial doctrine of custom is "the doctrine by which ancient customs 
practiced by a definite community in a distinct geographic locale, though contrary to the 
common law, are recognized by royal judges to constitute local common law for the land 
and people of the region." Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 183. 
169. In British jurisprudence, a general custom, the "custom of the country," is the 
common law itself. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 742 (quoting 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMllfENTARIES *67 ("General customs, which are the universal 
rule of the whole kingdom ... form the common law.")). For a detailed history of the 
doctrine of custom in English jurisprudence, see Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166. 
170. One of the more interesting aspects of the doctrine, according to Professor 
Rose, is that it vests rights in the unorganized public, as opposed to individuals. She notes, 
however, that although these communities were informal and indefinite, they nevertheless 
were capable of self-management. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 742. 
171. Custom is recognized by common law courts as lex loci or local common law. 
See Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 186. 
172. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 740; see also Starr, Coastal 
Land, supra note 71, at 142 n.202 (proof of customary usage requires that use be 
(1) ancient, (2) exercised without interruption, (3) peaceable and free from dispute, (4) rea-
sonable, (5) certain, (6) obligatory, and (7) not repugnant to other customs or laws) 
(paraphrasing William Blackstone). · 
173. Professor Rose finds it noteworthy that the surviving customary rights are those 
useful for recreational purposes. See Rose,. Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 
740-41. 
174. See, e.g., Race v. Ward, 4 El. & Bl. 702, 119 Eng. Rep. 259 (Q.B. 1855) 
(holding no trespass action available against inhabitants for violating an enclosure decree 
cutting them off from well, based on custom and fifty years of use), cited in Loux, Ancient 
Regime, supra note 166, at 205. In a more recent application, custom doctrine prevented 
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While early nineteenth-century American courts seemed will-
ing, albeit reluctant, to acknowledge a limited doctrine of custom-
ary claims, 175 by the end of the century, courts appeared generally 
hostile to such claims. 176 Today, only a handful of states, most 
notably New Hampshire, 177 Oregon178, Texas, 179 and Hawaii, 180 rec-
ognize customary claims explicitly, 181 and then only with respect 
to beach access. 182 In such jurisdictions, custom may be considered 
a background principle of the law of property, because the custom 
a landowner from blocking access to his land by fishermen, who had for many years dried 
their nets on it. Mercer v. Denne, (1904) 2 Ch. 534 (Farwell, J.), aff'd (1905) 2 Ch. 538 
(C.A.), cited in Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 186-87. 
175. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 741. But see Steven 
Hahn, Hunting, Fishing, and Foraging: Common Rights and Class Relations in the 
Postbellum South, 26 RADICAL HisT. REV. 37 (1982) (arguing that from earliest settlement 
until late in the 19th century, custom and law circumscribed and widened use rights) (copy 
on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) [hereinafter Hahn, Hunting]. Accord-
ing to Hahn, the customary rights could not be abrogated by private title: "The woods 
were put here by our Creator for a benefit to his people ... [endowing] custom to the 
range [with] legal, moral, and bible [sanction)." !d. at 55, (citing Carroll Free Press, May 
8, 1885, June 5, 1884, June 25, 1885). 
176. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 741. 
177. See Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524 (N.H. 1845) (recognizing customary right of 
passage), cited in Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 739 n.135; see also 
Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387, 409 (N.H. 1851) (upholding public right of access to collect 
seaweed based on custom), cited in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 370 
n.280. 
178. See State .ex rei. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 677 (Or. 1969) (holding 
custom as basis for public access to dry sand beach); see also Stevens v. City of Cannon 
Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (city's denial of permit to build seawall on oceanfront 
property does not effect a taking, where public use of dry sand areas is so notorious that 
notice of such custom must be presumed). 
179. See Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957, 958-59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990) (holding that public easements acquired by custom do not 
effect taking); Matcha v. Mattox ex rel. People, 711 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), 
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987) (finding that an established easement on privately 
owned beach held to be public through prescription, dedication, and custom). 
180. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968) (holding that Hawaiian custom 
determines location of seaward boundaries), cited in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra 
note 167, at 370 n.280. 
181. See United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 772-73 
(D. V.I. 1974), aff'd 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding public recreation area on beach 
established by custom); State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1101 (Idaho 1979) 
(holding custom valid in Idaho although elements not met with regard to disputed parcel). 
Other courts have implied limited recognition of custom, noting the Thornton decision 
with favor. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 
73, 78 (Fla. 1974); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 59 (Cal. 1970). For these and 
other citations, see Alfred T. Clayton, Jr., Casenote, Oregon's 'New' Doctrine of Custom: 
McDonald v. Halvorson, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 787, 793 n.38 (1990). 
182. Most states appear to have taken no position on the doctrine. Only a few 
jurisdictions have rejected it. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 179 (Me. 
1989); Leabo v. Leninski, 438 A.2d 1153, 1156-57 (Conn. 1981); Smith v. Bruce, 244 
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must be based on a use so "notorious" as to be obvious to all.183 
There are inherent limitations in the doctrine, however, which may 
constrain the doctrine's versatility even in these few state jurisdic-
tions. 
First, the requirement for uninterrupted practice of a custom 
may be a serious disability to the doctrine's use as an enabling 
principle. Unlike the public trust doctrine, which can lie dormant 
for centuries before being resurrected, 184 custom requires that the 
public's use of the land be uninterrupted for as long as anyone can 
remember. 185 Customary rights may lapse from disuse and can be 
easily defeated by determined landowners.186 As a result, custom 
presents serious problems of proof, especially in areas undergoing 
rapid development.187 
Another potentially disabling factor is the restriction of the 
custom doctrine in this country to beaches. Unlike the public trust 
doctrine, which has grown increasingly amphibious over time, 188 
custom has stayed rooted in the sand. If, however, one follows the 
logic of Professor Rose's analysis of the doctrine's foundation, and 
her conclusions about "inherently public property," an argument 
can be made for the doctrine's potential application to a broader 
array of land types.1s9 
According to Rose, if a piece of physically monopolizable 
land has greatest value when held in common, the public's claim 
is inherently superior to that of the private landowner.190 As the 
ancient doctrine of custom was developed to preserve the unorgan-
ized public's rights in those lands~ it follows that the doctrine can 
be applied to any qualifying land. Trails across private property 
S.E.2d 559, 569 (Ga. 1978); Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor and Council of 
Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (Md. 1975). 
183. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993). 
184. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792 
(Cal. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Summa Corp. v. California ex rei. State Land Comm'n, 466 
U.S. 198 (1984) (public trust doctrine held not to apply). See also infra part lli.B.2.a. 
185. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
186. As an example, consider Yale University's practice of closing its gates once a 
year to prevent the establishment of customary use. 
187. For a more thorough discussion of the problems associated with the doctrine 
of custom, see Jonathan M. Hoff, Comment, Public Beach Access Exactions: Extending 
the Public Trust Doctrine to Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1049, 1057-60 
(1981) [hereinafter Hoff, Public Beach Access]. 
188. See infra part lli.B.2.a. and accompanying notes. 
189. For a more in-depth discussion of this concept, see infra part lli.B.2.b. 
190. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 774. 
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and portages around rapids on private land are but two potential 
applications, both of which appear analogous to the beach access 
rights that Rose discusses. 191 As discussed elsewhere in this Article, 
the geographic range of custom could potentially encompass areas 
where people have hiked or recreated for generations. 192 However, 
given the historic resistance to custom doctrine by many states and 
its limited, infrequent use, it seems unlikely that many jurisdictions 
will be inclined to expand its geographic scope, no matter how 
compelling the doctrinal basis. 
Another limitation of custom lies in its focus; unlike the 
public trust doctrine, which applies to the land itself, 193 custom 
doctrine applies only to the uses to which the land has been put. 
Its principles arose from habits of use and understandings about 
local custom, 194 not from any particular value of the land con-
cerned. 195 This may be a distinction without a difference, since 
ruining the land would necessarily interrupt or prevent its custom-
ary use. By this means, custom can sometimes achieve the same 
goal as the public trust doctrine, by preventing the land's destruc-
tion. 
If a customary use can be established for a piece of land, 196 
the doctrine can be applied to preserve the land for that use without 
191. According to Professor Rose, beaches are the perfect fit for this paradigm, 
because of the value added to the property by public recreation and the opportunity for 
private holdout. See id. at 779-81. But this does not mean that other land, such as 
wetlands, might not qualify. See infra part III.B.2.b. 
192. See infra part III.B.2.b. 
193. See infra part III.B.2.a. 
194. According to one scholar, the greatest significance of custom lies in the fact 
that its origins and legitimacy derive from the praxis (or use) of the community. Loux, 
Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 183. 
195. "It was the public's habit of use, rather than anything unique about the property 
ab initio," that subjected the property to custom. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra 
note ii, at 759-60, citing President of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431, 
439 (1832) (holding that prolonged public usage sufficient to dedicate land to public if 
interruption of use would substantially affect public accomodation). 
196. In England, once a practice or use was recognized by a common law court as 
the local custom of an area, it automatically became recognized by all common law courts 
without proof of the custom. See Loux, Ancient Regime, supra note 166, at 187. Bllt see 
McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989) (modifying rule of law set down in State 
ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969), that custom affirmed public right to 
make recreational use of Oregon's coastal beaches to apply only to beaches similarly 
situated to the beach in Thornton). See also Alfred Clayton, Jr., Note, 26 WILLAMETTE L. 
REv. 787, 789 (1990) (arguing that McDonald modified Thornton such that application of 
doctrine of custom to Oregon coast will require tract by tract litigation). 
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effecting a taking.197 A distinct, although not undisputed, potential 
advantage of custom over other common law property doctrines, 
such as prescription, implied easement, or adverse possession, is 
that it may be applied to a large region, rather than a single tract 
of land.198 Thus, once custom is found to apply to a given beach, 
then it should automatically apply to all other beaches in the 
state. 
The common law doctrine of custom offers an intriguing op-
portunity to restrict the freedom with which private landowners can 
alienate public rights in certain property. As the essence of the 
doctrine is the "understandings of our citizens,"199 custom would 
appear to be one of the Lucas Court's "background principles of 
property" that "inhere[s] in the title itself."200 As such, it could be 
used where applicable to support "measures newly enacted by the 
State in legitimate exercise of its police powers"201 on property 
impressed with a customary usufruct. Unfortunately, the use of 
custom is inhibited both by limitations in the doctrine itself, and 
by its current narrow acceptance in this country. The public trust 
doctrine, as the next section illustrates, is considerably more ver-
satile. 
197. Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (holding that denial of a 
permit to build seawall was not taking where public right to use an ocean beach was 
established by custom). See also Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990) (holding that requiring owner to remove 
obstacles to access beach under terms of Open Beaches Act not taking, since Act involved 
enforcement of easements previously acquired through prescription, dedication, and cus-
tom). 
198. See Starr, Coastal Land, supra note 71, at 143 (citing Thornton, 462 P.2d at 
675-76 (holding that established custom can be proven with reference to larger region)). 
This feature lessens the burden on the state by avoiding expensive tract-by-tract litigation. 
See id. But see McDonald, 780 P.2d 714 (limiting geographic reach of Thornton to 
similarly situated beaches); Hoff, Public Beach Access, supra note 187, at 1058 (enforce-
ment requires litigation on tract-by-tract basis, resulting in haphazard and costly enforce-
ment of public rights). 
199. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992). 
200. Id. at 2900. 
201. Id. at 2899. 
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2. The Public Trust Doctrine202 
The public trust doctrine is a controversiaF03 common law 
property concept that treats tidelands and certain other lands and 
waters204 as "held in trust" for the citizens of various states, and 
requires that they be used only for the public's interests. The 
California Supreme Court explained the broader meaning of this 
responsibility in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: 
[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to 
use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of 
the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of 
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right 
202. Although many articles have been written on the public trust doctrine, the 
definitive work remains Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natllral Resource 
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Public 
Trust]. But see Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's 
Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection and Some Dark Thoughts on the 
Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209 passim (1991) (criticizing Sax's work 
as forestalling more promising approaches). For an exhaustive list of other articles on 
public trust (and a highly critical look at the doctrine itself), see Lloyd R. Cohen, The 
Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 239 n.1 (1992) , 
[hereinafter Cohen, Economic Perspective]. For an even more voluminous list, see Valerie 
B. Spalding, The Pearl in the Oyster: The Public Trust Doctrine in North Carolina, 12 
CAMPBELL L. REv. 23, 24 n.4 (1989) [hereinafter Spalding, Pearl]. 
203. Professor Wilkinson gives two basic reasons for the intensity of debate over 
the public trust doctrine: first, the doctrine focuses on water-based property, which is 
among the most valued of our natural resources in both economic and conservation terms; 
second, the manner in which the doctrine's application causes a "quick collision between 
two treasured sets of expectancy interests-private property owners and the general 
public." Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the 
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 426 (1989) [hereinafter 
Wilkinson, Headwaters]. 
204. Courts have long recognized the special status of water rights: 
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and independent of 
particular theory than the interest of the public of a state to maintain the rivers 
that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts 
upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose 
of turning them to more perfect use. This public interest is omnipresent 
wherever there is a state, and grows more pressing as population grows .... 
The private right to appropriate is subject not only to the rights of lower 
owners, but to the initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one 
of the great foundations of public welfare and health. 
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908), quoted in Helen Ingram 
& Cy R. Oggins, The Public Trust Doctrine and Community Values in Water, 32 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 515, 527-28 (1992). 
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of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that 
right is consistent with the purposes of the trust .... 205 
37 
The doctrine is most often applied to coastal or riparian land 
resources.Z06 Over time, the doctrine has served as both a source of 
and a limitation on state legislative and ·administrative powers over 
such lands.207 Both of these public trust functions are considered 
essential underpinnings of a responsible government. As a Wiscon-
sin court put it: 
The legislature has no more authority to emancipate itself from 
the obligation resting upon it which was assumed at the com-
mencement of its statehood, to preserve for the benefit of all 
the people forever, the enjoyment of the navigable waters within 
its boundaries, than it has to donate the school fund or the state 
capital to a private purpose.208 
Unlike custom, the doctrine of public trust has shown enor-
mous vitality and flexibility209 in the modern era.210 The Lucas 
decision could give the doctrine even more prominence, 211 as public 
205. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 
724 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
206. See, e.g., id. (holding that public trust doctrine imposes duty on state to 
consider trust uses in allocating water resources). 
207. The public trust doctrine will cause a court to "look with considerable 
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate a 
resource [held available for the general public] to more restricted uses or to subject public 
uses to the self-interest of private parties." Sax, Public Trust, supra note 202, at 490; see 
also Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REv. 671, 694-96 (1991) (discussing authorizing and limiting powers of public 
trust doctrine). 
208. Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896), 
aff'd on reh'g, 79 N.W. 780, 781 (Wis. 1899) (voiding state law authorizing draining of 
lake for private development). 
209. At least one scholar has complained that this flexibility, brought about by the 
zeal and imagination of the doctrine's proponents, has taken public trust well beyond its 
legal roots in property, thereby upsetting public expectations. See James L. Huffman, A 
Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. 
L. 527 (1989) [hereinafter Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine]. 
210. Its continued strength is clearly evident; the public trust doctrine has been 
identified as a principle vehicle for the ongoing reformulation of American property law. 
See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1269, 
1289-90 (1993); Rieser, Ecological Preservation, supra note 147. 
211. But see Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 713-16. Professor 
Lazarus argues that the public trust doctrine has been weakened by_ recent Supreme Court 
decisions, particularly Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Land Comm'n, 466 U.S. 
198 (1984). See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 692 n.368. But several 
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trust principles may well be employed by government regulators212 
in their attempts to justify their actions under the Lucas takings rule.213 
a. Origins214 and Some Modem Uses of the Public Trust 
Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine's origins date back to Roman law, 
which held that the air, the streams and rivers, the sea, and the 
shoreline were common to all, and that everyone had an equal right 
to their use.215 More recently, English common law gave these 
resources to the King,216 but impressed upon regal ownership the 
duty to hold them for the people.217 
bases of his argument-current takings jurisprudence and liberalized views of state 
declarations of police power authority-have been called into question by the Court in its 
Lucas decision. See id. at 675-76. 
212. See, e.g., Kreiter v. Chiles, 595 So. 2d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 325 (1992) (holding that state's denial of private dock on land held in 
public trust not taking for which private owner may be compensated). 
213. Potential employment of the doctrine to prevent alienation of trust property for 
private use and to bolster governmental regulatory authority over certain property, such as 
coastal areas and tidelands, has caused anxiety among some commentators. See Lazarus, 
Changing Concepts, supra note 115 (public trust doctrine obscures analysis and makes 
reworking of natural resources law more difficult); Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra 
note 202, at 276 ("[R]esurrection and transformation of the ancient English public trust 
doctrine into a device to abrogate private property rights is a piece of disingenuous 
gimmickry which does its champions no honor."). 
214. For a thorough discussion of the origins of the public trust doctrine, see 
Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115. See also Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine, 
supra note 209 (origins found in property, not trust, constitutional or some other legal 
taxonomy); Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American 
Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515 (1989) (public trust is fundamental doctrine in American 
property law, assuming in some states character of implied constitutional principle); 
Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A 
Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573 (1989) (doctrine rooted in 
state constitutions). For a more critical view, see Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra note 
202, at 275 (modem public trust doctrine rests on inapposite English precedent). 
215. THE INsTITUTES OF JusTINIAN 67-70 (T. Coopered. & G. Harris trans., 1812), 
cited in Brent R. Austin, Comment, The Public Trust Misapplied: Phiiiips Petroleum v. 
Mississippi and the Need to Rethink an Ancient Doctrine, 16 EcoLOGY L. Q. 967, 969 
n.10 (1989) [hereinafter Austin, Public Trust]. But see Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra 
note 202, at 249-51 (suggesting that public trust doctrine advocates have "an exaggerated 
notion of the extent of communal rights in Roman law and practice"). 
216. See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 635. Professor Cohen 
points out that the English public trust doctrine acted as a constraint only on private 
property owned by the King for his own benefit. Therefore, he finds the "original 
motivation of the doctrine" to be "completely inapposite to our modern republican form 
of government," in which there is no need to distinguish between property held by the 
government for the benefit of the governed and that held for the benefit of the governors, 
as the latter category is a "null set:' See Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra note 202, at 252. 
217. A description of those public trust rights in English common law that were 
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After the American Revolution, the thirteen former colonies 
inherited the public trust doctrine among many other legal princi-
ples.218 The doctrine of public trust passed to new states219 of the 
Union under the Equal Footing Doctrine.220 As the new country's 
boundaries pushed south and west, Spanish, Mexican, and French 
law exerted their influence on the shape of American public trust 
doctrine.221 By the late 1880s, the doctrine had significantly ex-
panded from its Roman and English roots.222 
passed on to 18th-century American legal scholars can be found in Sir Matthew Hale's De 
Jure Maris and De Portibus Maris and in his explication of public rights in royal and 
private property. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at" 24-27; see also Lazarus, Changing 
Concepts, supra note 115, at 636 (for more information on Hale's contribution to American 
public trust theory). 
218. Susan D. Baer, The Public Trust Doctrine-A Tool to Make Federal Adminis-
trative Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land and Its Resources, 15 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 385, 389 (1988); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1894) (citing 
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409-11 (1842)). But see Paul S. Reinsch, The 
English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, cited in 31 BULL. OF THE U. OF 
Wis.: EcoN., PoL. Sci., AND HisT. SERIES 393, 400 (1899) (explaining that "the legal 
theory of transfer'' of English common law to the colonies was far from linear). 
219. Prior to each state's incorporation, its submerged lands were held in trust by 
the federal government. Once the titles to such lands were vested in a state, all federal 
sovereignty over them was extinguished. See Austin, Public Trust, supra note 215, at 
969-70; see also Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 
205 (1984). 
220. Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, each state succeeded on an equal footing 
with all others to the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain. See Pollard's 
Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845); see also Montana v. United States, 
450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Borax Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 (1935); Shively 
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894) (states admitted into Union after adoption of Constitution 
granted same rights as original States in tide waters and lands below high water mark); 
Wilkinson, Headwaters, supra note 203, at 444-45 nn.81-82; Carol Kamm, Note, Public 
Trust, Farmland Protection and the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act: Red Hill 
Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 811, 823 n.68 (1991). 
221. In Spanish and Mexican law, the public trust doctrine extended not only to 
tidelands, but also to pueblo common lands and to fresh waters flowing through the pueblo. 
"The pueblo water-rights doctrine holds that American cities that originated as Spanish 
pueblos have a paramount right to use water naturally occurring within the old pueblo 
limits to supply the needs of the city and its inhabitants." SELVIN, supra note 18, at 219. 
The doctrine was enunciated as early as 1881, in Feliz v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 
73, 78-80 (1881), and was used as recently as 1975 by Los Angeles to enjoin San 
Fernando from extracting water underlying Los Angeles. See City of Los Angeles v. City 
of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975). See generally SELVIN, supra note 18, at 219-25. 
In the last few decades it has been applied in New Mexico as well. See Cartwright v. 
Public Service Co., 343 P.2d 654 (1959) (incorporating doctrine of pueblo water rights 
into New Mexico's jurisprudence). The implications of this doctrine for public trust 
jurisprudence in California and New Mexico will be the subject of a future article by the 
author of this Article. 
222. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at 147. During this period state courts sanctioned 
not only the devolution of trust properties into private ownership (provided the states did 
not relinquish regulatory control), but also uses of trust property far beyond those 
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In the early days of this country, the public trust doctrine was 
most often used to prevent states from alienating publicly held 
resources to private interests.223 Its application widened during the 
nineteenth century, reflecting the changes in the country's eco-
nomic and physical conditions.224 Since the publication in 1970 of 
Professor Sax's vanguard article on the subject,225 the public trust 
doctrine has become newly prominent in environmental litigation,226 
particularly at the state level. 227 Modern uses of the doctrine by 
private228 and public229 litigants have included preventing state and 
federal governments230 from transferring title over publicly held 
contemplated by Lord Hale, Blackstone, or Joseph Angell, in order to further the nation's 
economic growth and changing political and economic needs. See id. at 148-50. 
223. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) (applying public 
trust doctrine to block private claim to shellfish beds); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387 (1892), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 154 U.S. 225 (1894) 
(applying public trust doctrine to block conveyance of Lake Michigan lakebed to private 
railroad); see also Johanna Searle, Note, Private Property Rights Yield to the Environ· 
mental Crisis: Perspective on the Public Trust Doctrine, 41 S.C. L. REV. 897 (1990). 
224. See SELVIN, supra note 18, at 5 (19th-century courts fashioned property law 
in general, and public trust doctrine in particular, to expedite economic growth). 
225. Sax, Public Trust, supra note 202. 
226. A major reason for the doctrine's resurgence is that it seems to enable litigants 
to sidestep the Takings Clause. James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through 
the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. 
LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 171, 189-92 (1987) [hereinafter Huffman, Myth of Public Rights]. 
227. Several states have recognized the applicability of the public trust doctrine to 
coastal resources. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); 
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); see also Charles 
M. Naselsky, Note, Public Trust Doctrine-Beach Access, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 344 
(1985). 
228. One of the more famous public trust cases brought by a nongovernmental 
litigant is National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (applying public trust doctrine to prevent Los 
Angeles from draining non-tidal tributaries of navigable lake). 
229. Courts generally affirm government reliance on the public trust doctrine to 
justify the exercise of authority over natural resources. States have successfully used the 
doctrine to acquire standing to seek injunctive relief for the protection of trust resources, 
Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm'n, 279 A.2d 388, 396 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971), appeal 
after remand, 299 A.2d 670 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 413 
(Wis. 1974); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Maryland, 293 A.2d 241 (Md. 1972) (halting 
quarry in wetland under public trust doctrine), or to sue for monetary relief. State Dep't 
of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1065-67 (D. Md. 1972); 
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, 
673-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976). One 
court even allowed the doctrine to be used to eliminate any laches challenge to a state 
enforcement action. See Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Board, 439 P.2d 575, 
578 (Or. 1968). But see Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (holding that 
public trust doctrine does not eliminate need to comply with federal statute of limitations). 
230. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975) 
(government has duty through public trust to protect national parks). For some general 
1995] Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches 41 
resources, and halting the conversion of trust property from one 
use to another.231 
The public trust doctrine has developed at the state level232 
without interference by the U.S. Supreme Court.233 The first re-
ported judicial application of the doctrine in this country was in 
1810, when a Pennsylvania court employed the public trust ration-
ale to deny a private claim to fishing rights in the Susquehanna 
River.234 Several similar cases in the original thirteen states quickly 
followed suit.235 
The "lodestar''236 Supreme Court case applying the public trust 
doctrine is Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.231 In that case, 
insights into the federal public trust doctrine, see Wilkinson, Headwaters, supra note 203, 
at 454-64; J. Wallace Malley, Jr. & Jeffrey M. Silverstein, The Public Trust Doctrine and 
Federal Condemnation: A Call for Recognition of a Federal Common Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 
501, 519-29 (1991); Baer, supra note 218. See also In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 
38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (public trust gives state right to sue vessel owner for oil spill 
damage); United States v. 1.8 Acres, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981) (public trust 
in land below low water mark must be preserved). 
231. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 
1986) (preventing state from converting public park into ski resort). 
232. Most of the states that recognize the public trust doctrine have been riparian 
doctrine states (e.g., lllinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin). Some Western prior 
appropriation doctrine states recognize it as well, including California, Idaho, Montana, 
North Dakota, and Washington. Other states recognize the doctrine statutorily, such as 
Maine, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. See Peter N. Davis, Protecting Waste 
Assimilation Streamjlows by the Law of Water Allocation, Nuisance, and Public Trust, and 
by Environmental Statutes, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 357, 378-79 nn.117-19 (1988) [herein-
after Davis, Environmental Statutes]; see also infra note 241. 
233. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Illinois Cent. 
R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). 
But see Summa Corp. v. California ex rei. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) 
(rejecting state's trusteeship claim in tidelands originating in private Mexican land grants 
because state failed to assert trusteeship rights during federal patent hearings). 
234. See Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810) (extending the application of the 
public trust doctrine to fresh inland waters); see also Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co., 
14 Serg. & Rawle 71, 79 (Pa. 1826); SELVIN, supra note 18, at 33-36, and cases cited 
therein. 
235. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Mass. (1 Cush.) 53 (1851) (applying 
doctrine to limit ability of riparian proprietors to construct wharves impeding public's right 
of free passage); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (applying doctrine to 
pre-Revolutionary grant of title to oyster bed). For a discussion of early state public trust 
cases, see NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE 
OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, LEGAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC TRUST ENFORCEMENT 7-15 (1977). 
236. See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 202, at 489; see also Wilkinson, Headwaters, 
supra note 203, at 450 ("Justice Stephen J. Field's opinion ... belongs on any short list 
of great natural resource opinions."). 
237. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). After this decision, many states issued similar rulings. 
See, e.g., State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640, 648 (Fla. 1893) (holding that 
state cannot transfer navigable waters and soil beneath them, but must hold them for public 
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Justice Field applied the doctrine to void a grant of a portion of 
the Lake Michigan lakebed:238 "Such abdication is not consistent 
with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of 
the State to preserve such waters for the use of the public."239 
Illinois Central remains one of the most comprehensive statements 
of the public trust doctrine. 240 
The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the 
public trust doctrine241 can be found in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Mississippi, in which the Court reaffirmed the state's ownership of 
non-navigable tidelands and impressed upon those lands a trust 
obligation to be exercised on behalf of the public.242 One of the 
navigation and fishing); Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 519 (Mont. 1895) (concluding that 
private title in lands between high and low water marks on navigable streams subject to 
right of public use); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918, 
922 (Wis. 1896) (holding that state's right in navigable lakebed is held in trust for public 
navigation and fishing; state has no proprietary interest, and cannot abdicate trust in 
relation to these lands); People v. Russ, 64 P. 111, 112 (Cal. 1901) (asserting that right 
of private landowner to reclaim swampland subject to public right to use of stream for 
tranportation). But see Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 383-84, 399 (1926) 
(state legislature under state law could grant tidal lands free of public rights by buying 
title back). For a discussion of these cases, see Huffman, Myth of Public Rights, supra 
note 226, at 195-96. 
238. For a more detailed parsing of Illinois Central than is generally given to the 
case by public trust scholars, see Huffman, Myth of Public Rights, supra note 226, at 
193-95. 
239. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. 
240. An earlier, equally strong judicial articulation of the public trust doctrine was 
set out in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Mass. (1 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851). 
241. Although Phillips was the last decision to address the doctrine, other cases 
have raised similar issues. The recent release of the Marshall papers revealed an unpub-
lished dissent by Justice Brennan in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 
825 (1987), in which he proposed using public trust to justify the state's exercise of 
regulatory power: 
The California constitution codifies a right whose genesis may be traced back 
to Roman law; the public's right of access to the sea. The State has adopted 
a regulatory scheme intended to preserve this longstanding public expectation 
in the face of increasingly intensive development along the California coast. 
As a result, no landowner in the coastal zone has any reasonable expectation 
of a right to use property in such a way as to deny the public access to the 
ocean. 
Justice Brennan, unpublished dissent drafted for Nollan 1 (on file with the Harvard 
Environmental Law Review). 
242. 484 U.S. 469 (1988). Phillips was written by Justice White. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred. The case drew a 
vigorous dissent from Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Scalia, principally because this was 
the first time the court had recognized a state's public trust title to non-navigable water. 
ld. at 485. The dissent also expressed concern for the property expectations of petitioners 
and thousands of other similarly situated landowners who believed they held valid title. 
Id. at 493. 
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more significant aspects of the Court's ruling was its adoption of 
an "ebb and flow" test to expand the application of the public trust 
doctrine to tidal limits of waterways, and its rejection of the nar-
rower standard of navigability.243 
Today, the public trust doctrine is "the settled law of this 
country." 244 Some states have codified the public trust doctrine in 
their constitutions245 or in legislation,Z46 while others have relied on 
the courts to develop the doctrine.247 
The modem public trust doctrine is based on the premise that 
the sovereign holds certain common properties in trust in perpetu-
ity248 for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. The 
243. The case potentially extends the public trust doctrine to wetlands adjacent to 
non-tidal tributaries of tidal rivers as long as there is an ultimate connection to the sea: 
Admittedly, there is a difference in degree between the waters in this case, 
and non-navigable waters on the seashore that are affected by the tide. But 
there is no difference in kind. For in the end, all tide waters are connected to 
the sea; the waters in this case, for example, by a navigable tidal river. Perhaps 
the lands at issue here differ in some ways from tidelands directly adjacent 
to the sea; nonetheless, they still share those "geographical, chemical and 
environmental" qualities that make lands beneath tidal waters unique. 
Phillips, 484 U.S. at 481 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 183 (1979) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)). For a discussion of the significance of this language, see 
Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 375. 
244. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 443 (1892). For a discussion of the doctrine's 
particular importance to western rivers, see Wilkinson, Headwaters, supra note 203, at 
472. 
245. See, e.g., CAL. CoNST. art. X, § 3 (restricting sale of certain tidelands), § 4 
(protecting public access to tidelands and navigable waters), art. I, § 25 (reserving in the 
people absolute right to fish and restricting sale of state lands along navigable waters). 
For a more detailed description of California's public trust doctrine, see Ted J. Hannig, 
The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A Proposed Balancing Test, 23 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211 (1983). 
246. The South Carolina Beachfront Management Act challenged by Lucas sought 
to withdraw the common law property right of private owners up to the high water mark. 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 (Law. Co-op. 1989) This amounted to an exercise of public 
trnst jurisdiction over those lands. 
247. For differing opinions on the wisdom of the judicial activism that has accom-
panied the growth of the public trust doctrine, compare Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra 
note 115, at 712-13 (arguing that long-term weakness of public trust, which counsels 
abandonment thereof, is its implicit assumption that the judiciary is in the best position 
to safeguard environmental concerns) with Wilkinson, Headwaters, supra note 203, at 
466-70 (arguing that judges can be expected to employ old and honored notions of 
trusteeship in order to fulfill public's interests and expectations). See also Sax, Public 
Trust, supra note 202, at 509 (public trust law is a technique by which courts may mend 
perceived imperfections in legislative and administrative process). 
248. The state retains an interest in trust lands even after they are given or sold to 
private parties, until they are so altered that their value as trust resources is substantially 
destroyed. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 373 (Cal. 1980); National 
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sovereign cannot alienate trust property to the detriment of its 
citizens, 249 except upon express approval by the legislature, 250 and 
only upon a legislative finding that the conveyance is in furtherance 
of the public interest or will not destroy the public's interest in the 
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (holding that state has power as administrator of public trust 
to revoke previously granted rights or enforce trust against lands long thought free of 
trust); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State Lands Comm'n, No. C-663-010 (Super. Ct. 
Los Angeles County 1990), cited in Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine 
in Washington, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 671, 686 n.93 (1991) (applying doctrine to 
sustain state denial of permits to locate offshore platforms on tidelands even though 
permittee held leases on lands); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 492 
So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Board of Trustees 
of Int'l Improvement Trust Fund of Florida, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987) (invoking public trust 
doctrine to invalidate sovereignty over lands mistakenly conveyed into private ownership 
during 19th century as swamp and overflowed lands); State v. Mcilroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 
664-65 (Ark. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980) (holding that freshwater streams 
are subject to public rights under newly promulgated recreational test of navigability), 
cited in Ausness, Wild Dunes, supra note 109, at 440 n.25. Bill see Cohen, Economic 
Perspective, supra note 202 (communal property rights lying dormant inside some erst-
while private property right waiting for judicial discovery and vindication undercuts secure 
and predictable rights in property). 
249. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see also Appleby v. City 
of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926) (compensating private owners for waterfront lots 
previously granted to them by New York State and subsequently taken by New York City 
on ground that intent to alienate public trust is clear and in public interest). According to 
Selvin, People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71 (1877) (holding that 
state can alienate its title in tidelands but not divest itself of paramount right of public to 
free navigability around piers) foreshadowed Illinois Central. SELVIN, supra note 18, at 
119-20. But see Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 
1022 (1988) (holding that express legislation does not abrogate public trust over tidelands, 
as state legislature has no authority to sell or abdicate state sovereignty over tidelands, 
and trust not relinquished by transfer of property); Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 351 
(1859) (affirming state's authority to alienate not only its title in coastal tidelands but also 
its regulatory authority over those lands), cited in SELVIN, supra note 18, at 119. 
The extent to which a state can alienate trust resources has been the subject of debate 
among public trust scholars. See, e.g., Huffman, Myth of Public Rights, supra note 226, 
at 192-96 (criticizing public trust cases following Illinois Central as ignoring state's 
ability to alienate trust resources); Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine: A 
Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516 (1989) (stating 
that in some states, the public trust doctrine, like the Equal Footing Doctrine, has assumed 
character of implied constitutional doctrine, immunizing it from legislative abolition). 
250. The origins of the legislature's ability to alienate trust lands can probably be 
traced to Joseph Angell's 1826 book on tidelands, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY 
IN THE WATERS AND IN THE SoiL, AND SHORES THEREOF at 106-07, cited in Rose, Comedy 
of the Commons, supra note 17, at 735-36. See also SELVIN, supra note 18, at 36-38. For 
an extreme instance of the legislature's ability to alienate the public trust, see Hart v. 
Burnett, 15 Cal. 530 (1860) (sustaining the transfer of San Francisco's title to several 
thousand acres of the downtown area to private owners). According to Se1vin, Hart was 
an important first step in the assimilation of the public trust doctrine into Californian and 
American jurisprudence as an instrument for resource allocation. SELVIN, supra note 18, 
at 172. For a discussion of early cases restricting a state's ability to alienate trust resources, 
see id. at 63-150 (alienation of trust property occurred throughout 19th century to facilitate 
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remaining resources.251 The courts strictly scrutinize state aliena-
tion of trust property.252 
Most states hold that the public trust doctrine acts to restrict 
government actions that adversely affect trust resources,253 and a 
few states have held that it imposes an affirmative obligation on 
states to preserve trust resources for use by the public.254 The 
doctrine has been used to provide a basis for states' authority to 
protect natural resources on privately owned lands and waters255 
and to impose additional affirmative duties on states with respect 
to those resources.256 For example, the public trust doctrine has 
economic growth as long as legislatures retained regulatory control over property's use 
and insured legitimate public access). 
251. See Paepcke v. Public Building Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11 (Ill. 1970); 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); City of Ber~eley v. Superior 
Court, 606 P.2d 362, 369 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). 
252. See, e.g., Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d at 369 (asserting that statutes 
abandoning public trust must be strictly construed, intent to abandon must be clearly 
expressed or necessarily implied, and statute should be given interpretation retaining 
public's interest in tidelands). It is ironic that the public trust doctrine requires strict 
scrutiny of state alienation of public interests in trust lands and that the Lucas opinion 
uses strict scrutiny to review state actions that restrict private property rights in the face 
of public claims. 
253. See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 650-55, 650 n.112. 
254. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (applying public 
trust doctrine to disallow conveyance of Lake Michigan lakebed to private railroad). 
255. See Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 59 S.E.2d 132 
(S.C. 1950) (holding that any ownership in lands below high water mark is subject to 
regulatory control of government), overruled on other grounds sub nom. McCall v. Batson, 
329 S.E.2d 741 (S.C. 1985) (abolishing doctrine of sovereign immunity); see also Illinois 
Central, 146 U.S. at 459 (stating that people hold soil under navigable waters in trust for 
common use as a portion of their inherent sovereignty, and any legislative act affecting 
use of trust lands affects public welfare and is within exercise of state's police power). 
For a highly critical analysis of the use of the public trust doctrine as a source of 
authorization for state regulatory power, see Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 
209, at 556-60 (positing that greatest distortion of historical purposes of public trust 
doctrine occurs when considering doctrine as source of authority for state regulation). 
256. Many articles have been written exploring potential uses of the public trust 
doctrine to protect important natural resources that might otherwise go unprotected. See, 
e.g., Daniel G. Kagan, Private Rights and the Public Trust: Opposing Lakeshore Funnel 
Development, 15 ENVTL. AFF. 105 (1987) (preventing overbuilding on lakefront property); 
Catherine R. Hall, Dockominiums: In Conflict with the Public Trust Doctrine, 24 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 331 (1990) (halting incursion of dockominiums on public trust shoreland); 
Heather J. Wilson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 ENVTL. AFF., 
839 (1984) (protecting Massachusetts' inland areas); Hoff, Public Beach Access, supra 
note 187 (strengthening police power analysis of legitimacy of Coastal Commission beach 
exactions); Anthony R. Chase & Gina M. Lambert, Remedying CERCLA's Natural Resource 
Damages Provisions: Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine into Natural Resource 
Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 353 (1992) (integrating state public trust doctrine 
into natural resource damage assessment process); Davis, Environmental Statt:tes, supra 
note 232, at 378 (mentioning the public trust doctrine as one of several tools to preserve 
sufficient streamflow for waste assimilation); Casey Jarman, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
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been used to force a state to identify impacts on public trust waters 
as part of the planning process257 and to regulate those waters 
affirmatively for the benefit of the public's right to use them.258 The 
doctrine has been applied to condition a water right held by Los 
Angeles so that the city would leave sufficient water instream for 
fish and wildlife. 259 It has provided a basis for sustaining a local 
ordinance requiring a permit to fill marshlands, stating: 
An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change 
the essential natural character of this land so as to use it for a 
purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which 
injures the rights of others.26o 
The public trust doctrine, unlike common law nuisance, does 
not require the courts to balance public and private interests.261 
Once a public trust interest is found in property on behalf of the 
the Exclusive Economic Zone, 65 OR. L. REV. 1 (1986) (enhancing United States steward-
ship over resources in EEZ); Michael L. Wolz, Note, Application of the Public Trust 
Doctrine to the Protection and Preservation of Wetlands: Can It Fill the Statutory Gaps?, 
6 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 475 (1992) (preventing diversion of water flowing into wetlands); 
Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 485 
(1989) (regulating nonpoint source pollution); Peter A. Fahmy, Note, The Public Trust 
Doctrine as a Source of State Reserved Water Rights, 63 DEN. U. L. REV. 585 (1986) 
(creating state reserved water rights). 
257. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) (stating that the public trust doctrine can be used to prohibit 
issuance of water appropriation permits for energy production facilities until comprehen-
sive, state-wide water use plan developed). 
258. See Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952), aff'd on 
reh'g, 55 N.W.2d 40 (Wis. 1952) (applying public trust doctrine to commit fishing stream 
to power generation purposes). 
259. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 
(Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). Note also that the court included language 
which presaged and preempted the possibility of a takings challenge: "(The public trust] 
authority ... bars [any party] from claiming a vested right to divert water once it becomes 
clear that such diversions harm the interests protected by the public trust." !d. at 712. 
260. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) (holding that 
shoreland zoning ordinance preserves nature, environment, and natural resources as they 
were created, a state of affairs to which the people have a present right). 
261. Courts occasionally require, however, that public trust uses be balanced. See, 
e.g., National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d 709 (requiring that state include explicit balancing 
test of consumptive and non-consumptive trust uses), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); 
lllinois Cent. R.R. v. lllinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892); Superior Public Rights, Inc. v. 
State Dep't of Natural Resources, 263 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that 
state should balance water-related trust interests and other interests). See also Davis, 
Environmental Statutes, supra note 232, at 381 n.l33. For a contrary view which argues 
that courts are not equipped to engage in the balancing process of public lands decision-
making, see Steven M. Jawetz, Comment, Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: 
Ineffective-And Undesirable-Judicial Intervention, 10 EcOLOGY L.Q. 455, 469-71 (1982). 
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sovereign, that interest is dominant over any private interests. There-
fore, in a state with lands impressed by the common law doctrine 
of public trust, any clash between public and private interests in 
those lands will be resolved in favor of the sovereign, extinguish-
ing private rights in those lands.262 
The public trust doctrine has expanded and metamorphosed in 
response to changing economic and social conditions as well as to 
changes in social values.263 This should not be surprising, as "prop-
erty law has always been functional, encouraging behavior com-
patible with contemporary goals of the economy."264 Thus, modem 
courts have expanded both the geographic range of the doctrine265 
262. See, e.g., Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 59 S.E.2d 
132 (1950), overruled on other grounds, McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985). See 
infra part III.B.2.c. 
263. Several scholars have recommended further expansion of the doctrine to bring 
it more into synchronization with the basic laws of ecology. See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra 
note 210, at 1289-90 (arguing that number of settings in which legal concept of public 
trust are applied should be greatly increased); Rieser, Ecological Preservation, supra note 
147 (explaining various theoretical bases for expansion of public trust doctrine to protect 
naturally functioning systems); Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1454 
(arguing that property definitions have always been functional and dynamic). 
264. Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1446-48. See also Richard A. 
Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 747, 751 (1990) (discussing need to create 
new forms of property to respond to emergence of new technological possibilities such as 
broadcast frequencies, patents, copyrights, and corporate shares). 
265. See, e.g., Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972) (public 
access to and use of dry sand beach); State of California v. Lyon, 29 Cal.3d 210 (1981); 
and State v. Superior Court of Placer County, 625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 865 (1981) (lands between high and low water in non-tidal, navigable lakes and 
streams); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (non-navigable tributary of navigable stream); 
City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 
(1980) (privately owned tidelands in San Francisco Bay); Just v. Marinette County, 201 
N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (wetlands); Robbins v. Dept. of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 
(Mass. 1969) (wetlands); Gould v. Grey lock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 
1966) (parkland); Sierra Club v. Dept. of Interior, 376 F.Supp. 90 (N.D. Ca. 1974) 
(parkland); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 
1984) (streambeds); Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. 
Resources, 341 A.2d 556 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (sand and gravel in streambeds); 
Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) 
(historic battlefield); Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (wildlife); 
Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 340 N.W.2d 722 
(Wis. 1983) (downtown area). For a comprehensive list of these and other cases, see Scott 
W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107 (1986). 
The doctrine, however, is not without limits. See, e.g., Mamolella v. First Bank, 423 
N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that doctrine does not apply to alley 
adjoining junk yard); Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 372 A.2d 1133, 1136 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1977), modified, 393 A.2d 579 (N.J. 1978) (holding that doctrine does not 
apply to man-made showers and bathhouses on seashore); Evans v. City of Johnstown, 
410 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding that doctrine does not apply to pollution from 
sewage treatment). 
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and the resources to which it applies, expanding it even into upland 
areas from its watery base.266 The list of protected trust interests has 
also grown to cover recreation, scientific research, and scenic view-
ing.267 Preservation of trust resources in their natural state has been 
held to be an appropriate public purpose protected by the doctrine. 268 
There is growing public recognition that one of the most 
important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed 
within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in 
their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for 
scientific study, as open space, and as environments which 
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which 
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. It is not 
necessary to here define precisely all the public uses which 
encumber the tidelands. 269 
266. Professor Coh~n finds no comfort in arguments based on either analogy or 
efficiency for the journey of the doctrine from tidelands to rivers and streams, let alone 
to inland ponds and mountains. See Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra note 202, at 
254-63. But see the following authors, each of whom propounds a theoretical basis for 
applying the public trust doctrine to those resources: Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra 
note 17; Starr, Coastal Land, supra note 71; Mary Kyle McCurdy, Public Trust Protection 
for Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 683 (1989); Fred R. Disheroon, After Lucas: No More Wetlands 
Takings?, 17 VT. L. REv. 683 (1993); Michael L. Wolz, Note, Applications of the Public 
Trust Doctrine to the Protection and Preservation of Wetlands: Can It Fill the Statlltory 
Gaps?, 6 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 475 (1992) [hereinafter Wolz, Statutory Gaps]. 
267. While the doctrine traditionally applied to navigation, commerce, and fishing, 
over time the courts have recognized a broader range of public uses of trust resources. 
See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (recreational, scientific, aesthetic 
uses); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952) (recreational uses and 
enjoyment of scenic beauty); Diana Shooting Club v. Rusting, 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914) 
(hunting and fishing over navigable waters); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 
1893) (sailing, rowing, fowling, bathing, skating, and domestic, agricultural, and city water 
needs); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 271 N.W.2d 69 
(Wis. 1978) (use of pesticides in urban lakes); Orion Corp. v. Washington, 747 P.2d 1062, 
1073 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988) (navigation, fishing, swimming, 
water skiing, and other related recreational purposes); Mayor & Mun. Council of Clifton 
V. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 539 A.2d 760 (N.J. Sup. 1987) (distribution of proceeds 
from water supply company); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 
452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984) (state decisions implementing hazardous waste law). See also 
Austin, Public Trust, supra note 215, at 1009-18 (public interest in trust lands, rather than 
type of land, should be used to define doctrine's boundaries). For an illuminating 
discussion on whether recreational uses support a right of public access to waterways and 
their shores under the public trust doctrine, see Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 
17, at 753-58. 
268. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). See also State of 
Cal. v. Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d 240, 247 (1981) (holding that areas of shorezone protected by 
public trust for recreational and ecological purposes subject to overuse can be closed to 
public bathing); State of Cal. v. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 216 (1981) (concluding that 
fast-disappearing resource of great importance for ecology and recreational needs of state's 
residents was protected by public trust doctrine). 
269. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
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The public trust doctrine should qualify as a background prin-
ciple of property law in the many jurisdictions in which it has long 
been used for a variety of environmentally protective purposes. The 
controversiality of both the doctrines of public trust and custom 
could, however, preclude their application to wetlands and barrier 
beaches unless their doctrinal underpinnings in thoses areas are 
sufficiently strong to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
b. A Solid Doctrinal Foundation Exists for Applying Custom 
and Public Trust to Wetlands and Barrier Beaches 
Looking at coastal and wetland resources through a common 
law lens, one can see how their destruction creates a public, and 
in some cases, a private nuisance. The harms that ensue-flooding, 
loss of water supply for drinking, agricultural, or industrial pur-
poses, and loss of livelihood through destruction of species-are 
classic nuisance injuries270 which can be avoided by preventing the 
destructive activity.271 Government regulation aimed at protecting 
these resources should therefore be able to rely on the common 
law of nuisance. Judicial precedent abounds; common law doctrine 
is on sound footing. 
Despite the characteristics and use of these lands,272 contro-
versy surrounds the applicability of the custom and public trust 
doctrines to barrier beaches and wetlands. Although the doctrines 
270. See supra part liLA. 
271. But see Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 10-11 (starting assumption of 
nuisance-that detrimental uses of land may not be socially intolerable or blameworthy-
through balancing process will allow detrimental uses). 
272. Barrier beaches and wetlands areas are classic public trust resources. They are 
essential for fish spawning as well as for shellfish beds, boating, timbering, oil and gas 
production, and recreation, to name just a few traditional public trust purposes. Other uses 
of these resources, such as freshwater supply, birdwatching, photography, hiking, and 
scientific study have also been recognized as protected public trust uses. See Marks v. 
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (acknowledging growing public recognition that one 
of the most important uses of tidelands is preservation in their natural state to accommo-
date scientific study and to provide habitats for birds and marine life). Wetlands provide 
commercially valuable products such as fish, shellfish, rice, and cranberries as well as 
opportunities of commercial value, such as recreation. See supra note 131. The fact that 
wetlands control erosion and sedimentation makes them essential to navigation as well. 
ld. See also EDWIN H. CLARK II ET AL., THE EONSERVATION FOUNDATION, ERODING 
SoiLS: THE OFF-FARM IMPACTS 82-84 (1985) (sedimentation occurring in harbors, bays, 
and navigation channels reduces capacity of these facilities to handle commercial and 
recreational crafts, increases likelihood of shipping accidents, and requires expensive 
dredging to keep facilities usable). 
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have successfully been applied to the former, no cases or articles 
could be found extending the doctrine of custom to wetlands.273 
Neither custom nor the public trust doctrine was considered part 
of the historic public trust, which focused narrowly on navigable 
waters.274 The fact that state courts have redrawn the boundaries of 
the public trust doctrine with abandon, even leaving the doctrine's 
watery base entirely,275 does not eliminate the need for caution. The 
controversy surrounding the use of these doctrines may make any 
further expansion of them suspect. 276 Unless a firm doctrinal foun-
dation can be placed under the application of these doctrines to 
Wetlands and barrier beaches are also classic trust locales. See supra part III.B.2.a. 
The fact that wetlands are often non-navigable is irrelevant for determining the public trust 
doctrine's applicability to them. American courts have long abandoned the requirement 
that public trust resources be navigable. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State of Mississippi, 
484 U.S. 469 (1988). As one scholar has opined on the issue of navigability, "the whole 
concept of navigability for determining anything other than the floating of a supreme court 
opinion should be abandon'ed." Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream 
Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 250 n.66 (1980) (paraphrasing 
Professor Charles E. Corker of the University of Washington). For a thorough discussion 
of the application of the public trust doctrine to wetlands and the relevance of navigability, 
see Wolz, Statutory Gaps, supra note 266, at 485-87. 
As noted elsewhere in this Article, the doctrine of custom has long applied to barrier 
beaches. Supra part ill.B.l. Recently, the public trust doctrine has been applied in one 
jurisdiction to dry sand beaches as well. See Neptune City v. Avon-By-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 
47 (N.J. 1972). 
273. Although several articles have been written on the applicability of the public 
trust doctrine to coastal and wetland resources, they are not entirely in agreement on how 
that is to be accomplished. See, e.g., Fred R. Disheroon, After Lucas: No More Wetland 
Takings?, 17 VT. L. REv. 683 (1993) (arguing that doctrines of navigational servitude and 
public trust defeat claims of private ownership in wetlands); Mary K. McCurdy, Public 
Trust Protection for Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 683 (1989) (positing that public trust doctrine 
applies to wetlands whether navigable or not); Wolz, Statutory Gaps, supra note 266 
(stating that public trust doctrine could be used to protect water resources on which 
wetlands depend, wildlife dependent on wetlands for continued vitality, or wetland itselO. 
For a discussion of the application of both the public trust doctrine and custom to beaches, 
see Starr, Coastal Land, supra note 71. 
274. See supra part ill.B.2.a. 
275. Reed, supra note 265, at 116-17. See Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 
115, at 649 (doctrine has steadily emerged from watery depths to embrace variety of 
upland areas and resources); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 
225 A.2d 130 (N.J. 1966) (holding that gas pipeline company was barred from condemning 
land devoted to conservation and preservation of wildlife because land devoted to prior 
public use); Olmstead v. City of San Diego, 124 Cal. App. 14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932) 
(finding that road would seriously interfere with park use); Parsons v. Walker, 328 N.E.2d 
920, 925 (Ill. App. 1975) (stating that public trust attaches to land conveyed to University 
of Illinois "as a forest, wild and plant-life reserve, as an example of landscape gardening 
and as a public park"). For an interesting discussion about the use of the concept of 
sovereign ownership in trust as a legal basis for economic expansion, as opposed to natural 
resource protection, see Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 640-41. 
276. For a particularly ascerbic view of the public trust doctrine, see Cohen, 
Economic Perspective, supra note 202, at 276: 
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coastal and wetland resources, their expanded use to reach these 
areas may not survive constitutional scrutiny when confronted with 
a countervailing constitutional right. Professor Rose's analysis of 
the historical underpinnings of custom and public trust provides a 
good starting point for the search for that foundation.277 
Professor Rose explores the doctrinal foundations of both cus-
tom and public trust to understand why they have survived in an 
era dominated by the concept of private property. In both doctrines 
she finds an implicit "longstanding notion" that certain kinds of 
property ought to be exempt from the classical economic presump-
tion of exclusive owner control.278 Such property can be owned 
collectively and managed by society at large with the public's 
claims independent of and superior to any purported claims by 
private landowners or governmental managers. She calls this prop-
erty "inherently public property."279 
Professor Rose has identified commerce as the central object 
of early inherently public property doctrines (such as custom and 
public trust).280 "Inherently public property," the object of those 
ancient doctrines, held out the possibility of infinite "returns to 
scale,"281 making the property extremely valuable to eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century England.282 But scale returns, or the capac-
The resurrection and transformation of the ancient English public trust doc-
trine into a device to abrogate private property rights is a piece of disingenu-
ous gimmickry which does its champions no honor. The public trust doctrine 
has been retrieved from the grave, and like some vampire, transformed into 
an obscure and pernicious force that it was not in life. It, and we, would best 
be served by reinterring it following a staKe to the heart. 
For other articles critical of any extension of the two doctrines, see Huffman, Myth of 
Public Rights,' supra note 226 (arguing against mythology of public trust doctrine); 
Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 633 (arguing against expansion of 
doctrine because it interferes with important process of reworking natural resources law 
and provokes clash between private property protection and natural resource preservation goals). 
277. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17. 
278. Id. at 713. 
279. Id. at 720. 
280. Id. at 774. 
281. Increasing returns to scale, a 19th-century concept used to identify natural 
monopolies subject to government ownership or public trust regulation, exist where greater 
production can lead to proportionately lower costs per item. According to Professor Rose, 
analogies to scale returns can be found in the doctrines of inherently public property (i.e., 
property subject to prescription, public trust authority, or custom), "felicitously expressed 
in the phrase, 'the more the merrier."' Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 
767-71. A modern example of scale returns is the telephone, where the tel~phone's value 
to the individual increases the more users of the system there are. 
282. Id. at 766-74. 
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ity to expand wealth, was riot the only feature of commerce in that 
era. According to Rose, commerce had educative and socializing 
virtues as well. She calls this "doux commerce."283 
The twentieth-century equivalent of "doux commerce," Rose 
writes,284 is recreation and properties devoted to recreational uses. 
The highest value of these lands is achieved when preserved for 
the public at large.285 The continuing vitality of common law doc-
trines, like custom and public trust, has as much to do with the 
protection of physical locations where recreational activities can 
take place, as with commerce or any historical provenance. 
For the doctrinal foundations of public trust and custom to be 
applicable to wetlands and barrier beaches, these lands must be 
perceived as "inherently public property."286 According to Professor 
Rose, in order to qualify, (1) the land must be physically capable 
of monopolization by private persons, and (2) the public's claim to 
the property must be superior to that of the private owner, because 
the properties are most valuable when left in their natural state to 
benefit an indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons. 287 Wetlands 
and barrier beaches would appear to meet both of these criteria. 
The pressures on these fast-dwindling resources make them uniquely 
susceptible to monopolization by private landowners.288 And, as 
shown infra, their contribution to commerce, both "doux" and mer-
cantile, makes the public's claim to them superior to that of private 
landowners. 
Pressures on coastal and wetland resources have caused them 
to decline significantly in both quantity and quality. Coastal barrier 
beaches have fallen to residential, industrial, .and agricultural de-
283. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 775. 
284. /d. at 779. 
285. Professor Rieser advances Professor Rose's analysis by finding analogies to 
"doux commerce" in ecological preservation. See Rieser, Ecological Preservation, supra 
note 147, at 402-03. 
286. Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 720. 
287. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 774 (arguing that 
property's "publicness" created the "rent" of the property, and public property doctrines 
(like public trust and custom) protected that publicly created rent from capture through 
private holdout). 
288. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571,574 (N.J. 1978) (finding 
that state was rapidly approaching crisis as to availability to public of its priceless beach 
areas); Borough of Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53 (N.J. 1972) 
(discussing how remaining tidal water resources in state ownership are growing very 
scarce because of increased population, while industrial development and recreational 
demands increase their importance to public welfare). 
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velopment, freshwater demand, and pollution.289 Wetlands have suc-
cumbed to ports and marinas, mining, farming, and urban, residen-
tial, and industrial development.290 In the United States, coastal 
population has risen by 40 million people since 1960.291 Over half 
of the United States population now lives within fifty miles of the 
shoreline, and the shoreline population continues to grow at four 
times the national average growth rate.292 Wetlands and barrier 
beaches are becoming increasingly scarce, and thus vulnerable to 
private monopolization or "hold up" by individual landowners. 293 
Furthermore, this process of development is devastating to barrier 
beaches and wetlands because both of these resouces are most 
valuable to the public when left in their natural state. 
Professor Rose finds in the educational and socializing values 
of "doux commerce" perhaps the greatest "returns to scale" pro-
tected by traditional property doctrines,Z94 .and finds in recreation a 
modem day surrogate to "doux commerce," the social glue that 
holds twentieth-century America together.295 Both beaches and wet-
lands offer important public recreational opportunities which they 
share with "doux commerce" and offer important educational and 
socializing effects that permit us to get along better with each other 
and teach us social responsibility.296 
289. See generally STEM1UNG THE TIDE, supra note 133. See also NATIONAL 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 50 YEARS OF POPULATION 
CHANGE ALONG THE NATION'S COASTS 1960-2010 (Apr. 1990) (predicting coastal popu-
lation will grow from 110 million to more than 127 million by 2010). 
290. For information on wetland losses, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
WETLANDS: THEIR UsE AND REGULATION (1984); W. FRAYER, T. MONAHAN, D. BOWDEN, 
& F. GRAYBILL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS AND 
DEEPWATER HABITATS IN THE COTERMINOUS UNITED STATES 1950's TO 1970's (1983); 
STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 133. 
291. STEM~fiNG THE TIDE, supra note 133, at 5. 
292. See STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 133. 
293. Over a period of 200 years, it is estimated that the lower 48 states lost an 
estimated 53% of their original wetlands and that, on average, over 60 acres of wetlands 
were lost every hour during that period. THOMAS E. DAHL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 
WETLANDS LOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES 1780's TO 1980's 1, 4 (1990). Barrier beaches 
were disappearing at a rate of 6000 acres per year by the 1980s. NATIONAL WILDLIFE 
FEDERATION, BULWARKS OF SAND •.. OUR VANISHING BARRIER ISLANDS (1980), quoted 
in BETH MILLEMANN, AND Two IF BY SEA: FIGHTING THE ATTACK ON AMERICA'S CoASTS 
12 (1986). 
294. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 775-77. 
295. Rose therefore concludes there is nothing surprising in the movement from 
commerce to recreation as the major reason to support the "publicness" of certain property 
and as a rationale for the use of both custom and public trust. I d. at 779-80. 
296. In 1991, approximately 35 million recreational anglers fished for wetland-de-
pendent freshwater, saltwater and shellfish species, 18 million Americans hunted migratory 
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Barrier beaches and wetlands thus appear to share many of the 
features of inherently public property described by Rose. They are 
susceptible to private holdout and promote both the mercantile 
interests of" commerce as well as its softer, socializing functions. 
This makes the public's claim to them far superior to that of any 
individual landowner. The doctrines of custom and public trust, 
which preserve the public's claim to these lands in their natural 
state, therefore properly apply to both types of property and have 
solid doctrinal support. 
The discussion up to this point has shown how both custom 
and public trust are background principles of property law that 
form the basis of our understandings about the bundle of rights 
which make up title to private property. Both doctrines have been 
used to protect public access to, as well as uses of, certain natural 
areas. 297 Although of ancient, and-according to some-suspect 
origin, both doctrines have displayed astonishing endurance, and, 
in the case of public trust, amazing flexibility and vitality. 
The doctrines of custom and public trust are being used in the 
context of this Article merely to provide background principles of 
common law to support regulatory initiatives protecting wetlands 
and barrier beaches. Even in such a supplementary or corollary role 
they may, however, generate controversy. This is particularly likely 
to be true when the doctrines clash with countervailing property 
rights, as in claims under the Just Compensation Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. Yet this clash is exactly what may happen if 
government regulatory and private litigants rely upon these com-
mon law doctrines to defend against takings claims by private 
landowners now that Lucas has revived common law property doc-
trines. 
and other waterfowl as well as big and small game associated with wetlands, and 
30 million of us listed wildlife observation among our recreational pursuits. NATIONAL 
AUDUBON SOCIETY, VALUING WETLANDS: THE COST OF DESTROYING AMERICA'S WET-
LANDS 5-11 (Deanne Kloepfer ed., 1994). 
Professor Rieser, in her search for a new theoretical basis for the public trust 
doctrine, argues that the ecological integrity of natural resources serves as a modern day 
surrogate for 18th- and 19th-century theories of commerce. See Rieser, Ecological Preserva-
tion, supra note 147. 
297. One criticism of the doctrines is that they protect only marginally useful 
resources. Another is that the doctrines are reactive, not proactive, and must await some 
attempt to convert areas protected by the doctrines before they are invoked. As to the 
marginality of the resources, see supra notes 131-133. At least one Justice believes that 
the doctrines have prospective force as well. See Justice Brennan's unpublished dissent in 
Nol/an v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, supra note 241. 
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c. The Intersection of Common Law Property Doctrines and 
the Takings Clause29& 
55 
The relationship between the public trust doctrine and takings 
jurisprudence has been largely unexplored by the courts.299 Few 
courts have adjudicated the issue of whether application of the 
doctrine will provide a complete defense to a takings claim or, 
conversely, whether a state can effect a taking of private property 
when, acting under authority of the public trust doctrine,300 it limits 
the use of that property in some way.301 While there has been only 
298. This question is discussed here only.in the context of the public trust doctrine. 
While several courts have found that custom is a complete bar to a takings claim, see, 
e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (city's denial of permit 
to build seawall on oceanfront property does not effect a taking in the face of a claim 
based on custom); Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1073 (1990) (holding public easements acquired by custom do not effect a 
taking), scholarship to date has raised the issue only in the setting of the public trust 
doctrine. Given that both custom and public trust transfer private property into public 
hands and create a pre-existing right in the public in those lands, the conclusions reached 
in this section with respect to the public trust doctrine should be applicable to custom as 
well. 
299. The Lucas Court could have avoided the spectral presence of the public trust 
doctrine and custom if it had followed more recent takings precedent and retained an 
expectational or functional definition of property. Instead, the Court incorporated into its 
view of property definitional or historic property concepts like public trust and custom. 
See Sax, Western Water, supra note 86, at 944. 
300. Several courts have found that custom is a complete bar to a takings claim. 
See supra note 298. 
301. Such questions have entertained public trust scholars for decades, causing 
considerable concern for some: 
[T]he [public] trust doctrine threatens to fuel a developing clash in liberal 
ideology between furthering individual rights of security and dignity, bound 
up in notions of private property protection, and supporting environmental 
protection and resource preservation goals, inevitably dependent on intrusive 
governmental programs designed to achieve longer-term collectivist goals. 
Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 633. See also Huffman, Myth of Public 
Rights, supra note 226 (arguing that public interest is better served by adhering to clear 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment than by avoiding amendment's· requirements through 
mythology of modem doctrine); Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 209, at 
568-72 (stating that modem doctrine is inconsistent with values of constitutional democ-
racy). But see Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. 
L. REV. 481 (1983), (concluding that the doctrine's development results in the redefinition 
of property rights to the disadvantage of property owners) [hereinafter Sax, Decline]; Sarah 
E. Wilson, Private Property and the Public Trust: A Theory for Preserving the Coastal 
Zone, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 57 (1984) (arguing that the concept provides an 
innovative basis for assertion of public rights to sustain protective environmental regula-
tions); Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27 (proposing a new way of analyzing just 
compensation clause challenges to governmental actions aimed at vindicating public rights 
in waters and tidally influenced lands); Johanna Searle, Note, Private Property Rights Yield 
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one instance in which an apparent assertion of public trust author-
ity has been declared unconstitutional,302 an exercise of public trust 
authority by a state should not be considered insulated from such 
challenges. 303 Since Lucas may invite the use of public trust as a 
defense to a takings claim, 304 one can foresee a clash between these 
two "competing, dynamic principles of American property law."30S 
Courts have commonly given several reasons why exercises of 
public trust authority should bar a takings claim and should not be 
considered a taking. One reason is that because the state cannot 
alienate trust property in favor of private interests,306 private inter-
ests must be considered subservient to the dominant public interest 
in those lands.307 Conveyance of trust land to private parties, there-
to the Environmental Crisis: Perspectives on the Public Tntst Doctrine, 41 S.C. L. REV. 
897, 910-17 (1990) (discussing clash between public and private property rights as courts 
attempt to carve judicial solutions to environmental problems). 
302. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (striking down Maine's 
intertidal law granting a public general recreational easement where recreational uses did 
not exist prior to the enactment of Colonial Ordinance 1641-47 of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony and were not developed as common law right after statehood). See Rieser, Public 
Trust, supra note 27, at 6-7. See also Huffman, Public Tnest Doctrine, supra note 209, at 
568. 
303. See Spalding, Pearl, supra note 202, at 43-45 (1989) (stating that a takings 
challenge will not likely survive in the face of state case law showing state's claim to 
tidelands or any other property or resources is protected by the public trust doctrine). 
304. The wisdom of relying on judicial activism to advance a political agenda may 
not necessarily be good for the environment. Berlin, Just Compensation, supra note 13, at 
147-50 (arguing that constitutional history indicates that attempts to use the courts to 
block progressive social legislation are probably ultimately doomed to failure and can lead 
to debilitating complacency). Moreover, the success of these efforts will depend on the 
robustness of the doctrine in the given jurisdiction and the willingness of the state court 
to defy the clear message of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas to chill regulations that 
have as their central goal preserving land in its natural state. See Sax, Understanding 
Lucas, supra·note 142, at 1437-38. 
305. Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27, at 5. 
306. Several courts have held that conveyance of public trust lands to private trust 
parties remains subject to the public rights in the property conveyed. See, e.g., San Diego 
County Archaeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923 (1978) (holding 
that a lagoon remained subject to public trust easement claimed by city and state based 
on Mexican grants), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 
198 (1984) (holding that state's claim to servitude must have been presented in federal 
patent proceeding to survive); see also Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Common-
wealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979) (holding that title to wharf and granite building 
constructed over filled tidelands is subject to public trust obligation that land be used for 
public purpose); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wash. 1987) (finding that 
privately owned tidelands are subject to public trust). 
307. See, e.g., Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987) (holding that public 
trust doctrine precluded takings claim because title to trust resources was acquired subject 
to whatever state action was necessary to protect public's interest in trust resources). 
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fore, remains subject to the over-riding public rights in that prop-
erty.3os 
The land in question is not, like ordinary private land held in 
fee simple absolute, subject to development at the sole whim of 
the owner, but is impressed with a public trust, which gives the 
public's representatives an interest and responsibility in its 
development. 309 
To allow the private owner to displace the dominant state interest 
by a takings claim would be the same as saying that the state 
cannot protect its interest in those lands. 
Another reason commonly given is that since private rights 
attached to the trust resources later than the public's rights, which 
originated with (or even prior to) sovereignty, private title does not 
include the right to affect trust resources adversely.310 Thus, the 
landowner has no title in that land in the first place.311 
Because a landowner cannot claim a property right she never 
possessed312 or, alternatively, has one that can be rescinded by the 
308. See United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Mass. 
1981) (finding that no developed western Civilization has recognized absolute rights of 
private ownership in public trust land below low water mark as a means of allocating 
scarce and precious resources among the competing public demands). 
309. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (Mass. 
1979). 
310. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 
(Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (holding no private vested rights to affect 
trust resources adversely); see also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 50 
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Warren Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't 
of Envtl. Resources, 341 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa. Commw. 1975). Conveyances of trust 
resources to private parties remain impressed with public trust, People v. California Fish 
Co., 138 P. 79, 84 (Cal. 1913) and State v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 239, 250 (Cal. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981), and remain subject to the sovereign's retained supervisory 
authority. See, e.g., 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. at 124; Bortz Coal Co. v. Common-
wealth, 279 A.2d 388, 396 (Pa. 1971), cited in Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 
115, at 655 nn.158-60. 
Some commentators suggest that this line of thinking ca11 also be seen in cases 
involving submerged lands, in which the courts consistently hold that public rights in trust 
resources pre-exist any private property rights in those lands. See Spalding, Pearl, supra 
note 202, at 45; Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27, at 38-41. See also Davis, Environ-
mental Statutes, supra note 232, at 384-85 (public trust and takings implications of Florida 
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (1986), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1053 (1987), 
aif'g in part 8 Ct. Cl. 160 (1985)). 
311. The most the landowner has is the equivalent of an easement or usufructuary 
interest in the land. Fee title to trust land must remain in the sovereign, since the sovereign 
could not divest itself of this interest in the landowner's favor absent a specific legslative 
directive to the contrary. See supra part III.B.2.a. 
312. Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 
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sovereign at any time, the Fifth Amendment provides no shelter 
from state action affecting public trust property. It is as though the 
private property owner of trust lands is merely a custodian of those 
lands for present and future generations, 313 and the state has an 
easement over her lands that permanently burdens ownership of 
them.314 
Any construct that removes exercises of sovereign authority 
from constitutional review has been (and should be) met with 
skepticism and concern. 315 
[A] constitutional democracy is a limited democracy, and it is 
the courts' role to be vigilant in imposing those limits. Among 
those limits is the fifth amendment's protection of property 
rights, a protection of little value if the courts are free to convert 
clearly defined easements into vast public rights. 316 
This concern may find expression in judicial dogma favoring the 
private landowner and rejecting common law doctrine in favor of 
a constitutional right. 317 The likelihood of this may increase as the 
doctrine moves further from its perceived historic roots.318 
(deciding that since no individual had the right to use her property to create a nuisance, 
state was not "taking" anything when it asserted its power to enjoin nuisance-like activity). 
313. Professor Sax suggests a usufructuary model of property rights as an analogue 
for this conclusion. Under this model, private landowners only have the right to use land 
in ways compatible with the community's dependence on the property as a resource. See 
Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1452. See also Rose, Environmental Ethics, 
supra note 11, at 31 (arguing that concepts of property, especially common property, are 
used to derive norms of responsibility and carefulness about shared trust); see also Carol 
Kamm, Note, Public Trust, Farmland Protection, and the Connecticllt Environmental 
Protection Act: Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 23 CoNN. L. 
REv. 811, 823 (1991) (including supporting citations); Austin, Public Trust, supra note 
215, at 1005; Forestier v. Johnson, 127 P. 156, 160 (Cal. 1912). 
314. Under this view, there can only be a consensual transfer of property to the 
government because under both custom and public trust the land is no longer in private 
ownership. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 17, at 716. 
315. See Lazarus,_ Changing_ Concepts, supra note 115, at 705 (arguing that liberal 
thought, particularly concern for private autonomy and security, was main impetus behind 
framers' inclusion of Just Compensation Clause in Fifth Amendment), 702-06. See also 
Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 209, at 569-70 (discussing public trust 
doctrine as means of evading fundamental values of Constitution). 
316. Huffman, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 209, at 534 (footnotes omitted). 
317. See, e.g., Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 
367 (Mass. 1979) (stating that public trust concept, with its implication of unbridled 
sovereignty, is "difficult to describe in language in complete harmony with the language 
of the law ordinarily applied to privately owned property"). 
318. See Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Resources, 327 N.W.2d 838, 850-51 n.43 
(Mich. 1983) (requiring state to compensate private parties in order to extend public access 
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Reliance on these doctrines by government regulators to de-
fend against takings claims may also destabilize expectations about 
property. To the extent property ownership plays an important role 
in promoting individual liberty, providing for political stability, and 
encouraging economic prosperity,319 any doctrine that threatens the 
stability of a regimen of private property could be challenged. 320 
Frustrating the expectations of landowners could lead to a backlash 
not only against the doctrines, but also against the environmental 
laws which protect wetlands321 and barrier beaches. 
to all recreational waters); Zinn v. State, 334 N.W.2d 67, 71-72 (Wis. 1983) (requiring 
compensation to private parties for extension of public trust beyond existing level of lake). 
See also In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 568 (Mass. 1974) (finding that 
legislation authorizing public access to private beaches takes private property, thereby 
requiring compensation), cited in Lazarus, Changing Concepts, supra note 115, at 649 
n.96. 
319. One of the chief advocates of this view of property is.Richard Epstein. See 
generally Epstein, Property, supra note 3 (arguing that property should be regarded as 
fundamental civil right because of its universality and utility, enabling resources to reach 
their highest and best use with minimum of friction). 
320. For a contrary view, see J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CoNST. CoMMEN-
TARY 239 (1990) (arguing for transformation of property law to achieve environmentally 
sustainable land use program). 
321. Wetlands regulatory programs are a favorite target of property rights advocates 
because they so clearly implicate questions of private rights, public values and fairness. 
A takings claim has been raised in more than one-half of the approximately 400 wetlands 
regulatory cases decided in the past 30 years. Jon Kusler & Erik J. Meyers, Takings: Is 
the Claims Court All Wet?, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWS (Envtl. L. Inst.), Nov./Dec. 1990, at 
6. In spite of this assault, in the past 10 years, only four wetlands cases could be found 
in which a court ordered the state to compensate a landowner. See 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. 
Hudson, 574 F.Supp. 1381 (B.D. Va. 1983) (denying permit to fill 11 acres deprived owner 
of all economically viable use of her land); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 
893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) (declaring 95% reduction in 
property value a taking); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) 
(denying permit for 12.5 acres of 250-acre site entitled property owner to $2.65 million 
because private interest in developing wetlands greater than state's interest in preserving 
it for wildlife habitat), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Formanek v. United States, 
26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (denying permit to fill 99 acres of wetlands on 111-acre site deprived 
owner of "highest and best use" of property entitling claimant to $933,921). But see Tabb 
Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992), aff'd 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(holding owner's losses insufficient because they amounted to no more than a diminution 
of value); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991) (finding 25% reduction in 
property value not a taking because land's remaining value exceeded owner's economic 
investment); Bowles v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 443 (1991) (finding no taking because 
owner not deprived of any economically viable use of land); Dufau v. United States, 22 
Cl. Ct. 156 (1990) (finding 16-month permit processing delay not temporary taking when 
action substantially advances legitimate state interest); Cloutier v. United States, 19 Cl. 
Ct. 326 (1990) (finding construction of 23-foot wall next to existing 13-foot flood wall 
not compensable taking); Deltona Co!P. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (denying permit to fill 10,000 acres of wetlands not 
taking because 80% of site still available for development); Jentgen v. United States, 657 
F.2d 1210 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (denying permit to fill 80 
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IV. INFUSING PUBLIC TRUST AND CUSTOM INTO TAKINGS 
JURISPRUDENCE SHOULD NOT DESTABILIZE EXPECTATIONS 
Under the new rule in Lucas, the existence of a common law 
footing for a proscriptive regulation eliminates the constitutional 
need to compensate owners of regulated property. It has been ar-
gued elsewhere in this Article that the common law doctrines of 
custom and public trust provide such a footing. By injecting these 
two common law doctrines into takings jurisprudence, Lucas sets 
up a conflict between private and public expectational interests in 
certain kinds of property. Unless these doctrines accord with com-
monly held public understandings about property, the conflict could 
have a destabilizing effect on the expectations of landowners.322 
A central function of the law of property323 is protection of the 
prospective landowner's reasonable expectations324 about the ability 
acres of 101.8-acre site where Corps offered to modify permit to fill 20 acres not taking 
even though landowner suffered diminution in economic value and frustration of reason-
able expectations). Until the recent decision in Loveladies Harbour, Inc. v. United States, 
28 F.3d 1171, 1180-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding proper denominator is acreage affected 
by permit denial), taking claims had been withstood upon a showing of reasonable 
remaining use of the property. See, e.g., Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 
(1992), aff'd 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
322. South Carolina is one state where there simply should have been no question 
about the applicability of the public trust doctrine to barrier beaches had the State Coastal 
Council been given an opportunity to raise the doctrine on remand. See State v. Pinckney, 
22 S.C. 484 (1884) (using doctrine to quiet title to tidelands); Cape Romain Land & 
Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 146 S.E. 434, 436 (1928) (holding as 
trust for public purposes title to land below high water mark on tidal, navigable streams 
under well-settled rule in state); Heyward v. Farmers Co., 19 S.E. 963 (S.C. 1894) (holding 
that state cannot convey trust lands); State v. Fain, 259 S.E.2d 606, 608 (S.C. 1979) 
(finding that title to land between high and low water marks remains in state for public's 
benefit); Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern, 252 S.E.2d 133, 135 (S.C. 1979) (determining 
that tidelands enjoy special status of being held in trust for public purposes); State v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 346 S.E.2d 716, 719 (S.C. 1986) (finding that issuing permit to 
enclose estuarine marsh violates public trust). See also Johanna Searle, Note, Private 
Property Rights Yield to the Environmental Crisis: Perspectives on the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 41 S.C.L. REv. 897 (1990). See Att'y Gen. Opin., 1975 S.C. AG LEXIS 1142 
(September 30, 1975) for a recitation of the provisions of the state's 1885 constitution 
establishing the public trust over barrier beaches and tidelands. With regard to the 
application of the public trust doctrine to the State's freshwater wetlands, see Carter v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327 (S.C. 1984) (citing Just v. Marinette 
County, 1201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972), with approval). 
323. Nuisance law is also premised on the reasonable expectation of the quiet 
enjoyment of property. See Copart Indus. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y. 
1977), quoted in State v. Schenectady Chern., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1983), modified 419 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
324. The majority's use of "existing rules or understandings" as a basis for defining 
the spectrum of uses that qualify for protection under the Constitution acts as an analogue 
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to acquire, use, and transfer property. 325 The doctrines of custom 
and public trust would appear to be at odds with this function 
because of their potential, when creatively interpreted, to transfer 
title unexpectedly from private to public hands, and thus desta-
bilize expectations.326 
The public trust doctrine helps to harmonize the laws of nature 
and the law of property, 327 bringing the expectations of landowners 
into harmony with the needs of nature by infusing an ecological 
perspective into property law. 328 This is beneficial because the laws 
of nature are fundamental and irrefutable, unlike the laws of prop-
erty, which can be changed by legislative or executive fiat.329 
The laws of nature teach us that private property boundaries 
have no relationship to the outer edges of an ecological system like 
a wetland or a migrating barrier beach. 330 The failure of current 
for those expectations. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 
(1992). 
325. See Epstein, Property, supra note 3. See also Epstein, Seven Deadly Sins, supra 
note 7, at 976 (arguing that permanence, stability and certainty are virtues of property 
rights system); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From Its Historical 
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185 (1980) (stating that central idea of public trust 
doctrine is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectati,ons held in common 
without formal recognition such as title) [hereinafter Sax, Historical Shackles]. 
326. The potential to destabilize expectations might be greater with public trust than 
with custom. A customary practice by its very nature puts the landowner on notice of the 
public's use of her land. Custom recognizes only long-standing, continuous practices by 
localities, and such use must be reasonable. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 
854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994) (holding use of dry sand 
areas by public so notorious as to create constructive notice that use is not part of bundle 
of rights acquired by purchaser). But see Hoff, Public Beach Access, supra note 187 
(stating custom places high evidentiary burden on public). See generally supra part III.B.l. 
The public trust doctrine, by contrast, does not require actual use by the public, let 
alone use continuous beyond the memory of man. See Cohen, Economic Perspective, supra 
note 202, at 257 (stating that bald assertion of set of communal interests now recognized 
as valuable can diminish private property rights and no compensation need be paid to those 
private property owners). Moreover, the doctrine's fluidity, constantly changing circumfer-
ence, and its anachronistic, esoteric provenance may make the doctrine's use problematic 
in any given case. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (holding 
private property rights in submerged lands divested in favor of public trust). But see Justice 
Brennan's unpublished dissent drafted for Nollan, supra note 241 (arguing that historical 
provenance of doctrine and consistent national application is sufficient to deprive coastal 
landowner of any reasonable expectation of right to deny public access to ocean). 
327. See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 210 (arguing that property law's basic messages 
about ownership are misguided insofar as they contradict the laws of nature). 
328. See Rieser, Ecological Preservation, supra note 147. 
329. Hunter advocates having the laws of nature, therefore, inform all of our social 
institutions. See Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 316. 
330. Fritsch states: 
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legal dogma to take into account the laws of nature has sig-
nificantly threatened the environmental stability of these ar-
eas.33t 
Creating severable property interests in interrelated natural 
systems like surface and groundwater, or dividing single surface 
systems into discrete ownership units, like grazing permits, without 
considering the impact on the larger ecosystem, is inconsistent 
with the laws of nature.332 "The boundaries that we draw, between, 
farm A and ranch B, carry no meaning in nature's terms. No coyote 
or egret reads our deeds; no percolating groundwater stops to ask 
permission to enter."333 This inconsistency creates a conflict be-
tween tpe laws of property and the functions of natural systems, 
which has resulted in the destruction of many natural systems.334 
Both public trust and custom can be applied to protect natural 
systems like coastal barrier beaches, the inter-tidal zone, or the 
tributary system of an inland lake.335 Horizontal or vertical owner-
ship entitlements are irrelevant to the reach of those doctrines. In 
that sense, the public trust doctrine comports more closely to how 
< 
The basic insight of ecology is that all living things exist in interrelated 
systems; nothing exists in isolation. The world system is weblike; to pluck 
one strand is 'to cause all to vibrate; whatever happens to one part has 
rantifications for all the rest. Our actions are not individual but social; they 
reverberate throughout the whole ecosystem. 
A. FRITSCH, SCIENCE ACTION COALITION, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: CHOICES FOR CON· 
CERNED CITIZENS 3-4 (1980), quoted in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, 
at 313-14. . 
331. Ecologists sound a note of urgency in their arguments for the need to reform 
legal and social institutions to better reflect an ecological perspective: 
The immediacy of the environmental crisis does not afford us the luxury of 
waiting for the rest of mankind to make the radical paradigm shift to a 
Spinozistic-Leopoldian ethical posture. For the immediate future, Nature must 
be protected from the uncontroverted and the ecologically ignorant by a vast 
interlocking system of national and international law. 
George Sessions, Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis, HUMBOLDT J. Soc. RBL. 
71, 80 (1974), quoted in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 317. 
332. Aldo Leopold's land ethic reminds us that "the individual is a member of a 
community of interdependent parts[,]" the boundaries of which "include soils, waters, 
plants, and animals .... " ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 239 (1966), quoted 
in Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra.note 167, at 318. 
333. Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 1279. 
334. See Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 1278-83 (stating legal property boundaries 
are factually wrong and gravely pernicious to extent they separate man from nature). 
335. See supra part lli.B.2.a. 
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natural systems actually work than do the laws of private property 
owner~hip.336 
The doctrinal foundations of both public trust and custom 
recognize land as part of a natural system on which we as a society 
depend, whether for the shellfish beds that provide a source of food 
or for the beaches that serve a socializing or educational purpose. 337 
Lands protected by these doctrines perform a communal welfare 
function. Both doctrines erect a trust over that land such that the 
owner of lands affected by either doctrine holds those lands in 
"trust for the rest of Creation."338 Under both custom and public 
trust, private property owners share fiduciary responsibility for 
their portion of the land to which these doctrines apply. Thus, a 
landowner cannot diminish the contribution her land makes to the 
public wealth by removing that land from the public trust or from 
public access.339 As Freyfogle writes: 
It is an error to suggest, as the law largely does, that how an 
owner treats a part of nature is his business alone. How a person 
deals with the land, given the linkages of nature, is public 
business, the concern of all Creation. 340 
J. Peter Byrne sees in the public trust doctrine a way to ar-
ticulate a fiduciary relationship between present· and future mem-
bers of a community which receives spiritual and biological vitality 
from any undeveloped or agricultural land. 341 He credits the public 
trust doctrine with teaching landowners in some jurisdictions that 
336. The Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 
481 (1988) recognized the interconnectedness of water-based habitat. See supra note 243. 
See also Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972); Just v. Marinette 
County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). 
337. See supra part III.B.2.b. 
338. Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 1289-90. 
339. This thought found legal expression in Just v. Marinette County, in which the 
court sustained a local ordinance requiring landowners to get a permit before engaging in 
activities in a wetland. 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) (holding .that owner of land has 
no absolute and unlimited right to change essential nature of his land so as to use it for 
a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures rights of others). 
See also J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CoNST. COMMENTARY 239, 242 (1990) 
(admiring this language for striking the "true green note"). See Hunter, Ecological 
Perspective, supra note 167, at 349-57, for a discussion of the significance of Just and its 
progeny. 
340. Freyfogle, supra note 210, at 1281. 
341. J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 239, 244-45 (1990). 
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if they purchase land in highly desirable areas, such as along the 
oceanfront, they will suffer "some loss of tranquility."342 
To the extent that the doctrines of public trust and custom have 
been informed by the laws of nature, they may prevent the desta-
bilization of public expectations caused by countering the laws of 
nature.343 An example of this occurred in the recent midwestern 
floods where the laws of private property, which enabled construc-
tion of homes in the flood plain, destruction of wetlands, diking of 
rivers, and stream channelization, clashed with the laws of nature 
resulting in disastrous loss of buildings and livelihood. 344 
To avoid destablizing public expectations, the reasonableness 
of any landowner's expectations about her property should depend 
upon what public expectations are (1) recognized as being held 
within the trust and (2) capable of disappointment should they be 
defeated by private action.345 One purpose of this Article has been 
to show that the public has an expectational interest in the ecologi-
cal integrity of barrier beaches and wetlands. 346 This interest finds 
expression in the common law doctrines of public trust and custom, 
which in turn are grounded on the inherently public nature of these 
properties. 347 
Unfortunately, public and private expectations are not always 
in harmony. A theoretical understanding of the public's superior 
interest in this inherently public property348 may founder on the 
reality of the landowner's justifiable frustration if results do not 
meet the landowner's expectations. A discussion of expectations 
necessarily depends upon the factors leading to them. However, the 
exact point at which owners can form private expectations about 
342. /d. at 248. 
343. "For most of the modern era, the technological use of land has operated to end 
'the existence of nature."' Sax, Understanding Lucas, supra note 142, at 1443. 
344. B. Drnmmond Ayres, Jr., St. Louis Wins the Early Rounds As the Mississippi 
Does Its Worst, N.Y. nMES, July 19, 1993, at AI, B6. 
345. Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27, at 40. 
346. See supra notes 128, 131, and 133. 
347. Another function of the public trust doctrine, according to Sax, is to avoid the 
destabilizing changes brought about by environmental crises, such as the sudden decline 
in a species or destruction of a watershed. See Sax, Historical Shackles, supra note 325, 
at 188-89. 
348. See Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 311-13 (arguing that 
the public should have a right in the ecological integrity of land on which survival 
depends). 
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the right to use property is addressed neither by the Lucas Court 
nor by public trust scholars.349 
[T]here comes a point at which courts simply cease to be 
sympathetic to owners' claims that their reasonable expectations 
are being sharply disappointed. That is, at some point the 
imposition of such restraints is no longer seen as sharply 
destabilizing for the land-development industry. One might say 
the same about the long line of wetland-protection cases. As 
such laws become more and more commonplace, wetlands 
owners will not be able to claim an expectational right to 
develop as they did in the past. 350 
The difficulty in finding and maintaining that point for the individ-
ual landowner is made worse by the changing nature of the public's 
expectations about the value of certain property.351 Nowhere has 
this been more true than in the field of environmental law, 352 as 
349. A post-Lucas decision by the Court of Federal Claims has fixed the time at 
which reasonable investment-backed expectations are created as the time at which the 
claimant takes title to her property. Presault v. United States, 27 Cl. Ct. 69 (1992) (holding 
that conversion of railroad right-of-way trail under National Trails System Act did not 
effect a taking because owners' reversionary interest in land had long been extinguished). 
[G]iven long-standing, pervasive and specific federal limitations on rights 
created by state law in respect of property burdened by a private easement for 
a public purpose, a landowner could [not] have developed a historically rooted 
expectation of compensation for postponement of those rights when state law 
does not recognize the rights independent of federal regulation. 
ld. at 89. 
350. Sax, Historical Shackles, supra note 325, at 188-89 n.13. The courts have 
consistently held claimants responsible for knowing about the status of restrictions on the 
use of their property. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (stating 
that chemical company could not have formed reasonable investment-backed expectation 
about the confidentiality of data submitted under statute allowing release of information 
to public). See also Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 321 (1991) ("[Where 
claimant knew he had to obtain wetlands permits and permits would be difficult to get], 
to find that the Federal Government has taken a property interest in the form of a distinct, 
reasonable, investment-backed expectation, would, in this instance, turn the Government 
into an involuntary guarantor of Ciampitti's gamble:'). 
351. Even the Lucas Court recognized that landowners "necessarily expect" that 
their expectational interests may "be restricted, from time to time, by various measures 
newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers;' Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct., 2886, 2899 (1992), and that "changed circumstances 
or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so." ld. at 2900. 
352. Lewis Thomas states: 
The oldest, easiest-to-swallow idea was that the earth was man's personal 
property, a combination of garden, zoo, bank vault, and energy source, placed 
at our disposal to be consumed, ornamented, or pulled apart as we wished. 
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illustrated by the expanding scope of the public trust doctrine. 
Changes in public expectations are brought about by changing 
socioeconomic priorities and new information.353 These changes in 
public expectations can cause serious dislocations in private expec-
tations.354 
It is in the very nature of common law doctrines to expand 
and change over time to reflect changing social mores and expec-
tations. The Lucas Court, by relying on common law doctrines to 
restrict the circumstances in which government may regulate the 
activities of private landowners, hil;S increased somewhat the op-
portunities for frustrating those landowners' expectations.355 At the 
The bettennent of mankind was, as we understood it, the whole point of the 
thing. Mastery over nature, mystery and all, was a moral duty and social 
obligation. 
In the last few years we were wrenched away from this way of looking at it, 
and arrived at something like general agreement that we had it wrong. We still 
argue the details, but it is conceded almost everywhere that we are not the 
masters of nature that we thought ourselves; we are as dependent on the rest 
of life as are the leaves or midges or fish. We are part of the system. One way 
to put it is that the earth is a loosely fonned, spherical organism, with all its 
working parts linked in symbiosis. We are, in this view, neither owners nor 
operators; at best, might see ourselves as motile tissue specialized for receiv-
ing infonnation-perhaps, in the best of all possible worlds, functioning as a 
nervous system for the whole being. 
LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL 103-04 (1974). 
353. The evolution in the public's attitude toward wetlands is illustrative of this 
point. Before enactment of the Clean Water Act, the prevailing attitude was that wetlands 
were waste lands. In fact, the historical and institutional preference had been to drain 
wetlands and to convert them to a higher societal use. See, e.g., The Swamp Land Act of 
1849, ch. 87, 9 Stat. 352; The Swamp Land Act of 1850, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519; The Swamp 
Land Act of 1860, ch. 5, 12 Stat. 3 (providing subsidies for the draining of swamps in 
several states). Hope Babcock, Federal Wetlands Regulatory Policy: Up to Its Ears in 
Alligators, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 311 n.20 (1991). Now wetlands, because the 
public knows more about their functions and is faced with a growing shortage of them, 
are considered among our most valuable natural systems; as a result, they are protected 
by a web of prohibitive federal, state, and local laws. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1986) 
(wetlands pennitting provisions of the Clean Water Act); 16 U.S.C. § 3901 (1986) 
(establishment of National Wetlands Priority Conservation Plan). 
354. Determining the reasonableness of a landowner's expectations about her prop-
erty use rights under these circumstances may be a matter of determining whether she had 
notice, at the time she acquired the property, of these common law doctrines as well as 
any changes in their scope. See Rieser, Public Trust, supra note 27, at 40 (arguing focus 
should be on whether legislature, courts, administrative agencies, and public sent signal 
to private owners of broader definition of public interest). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (stating property owners were on notice that state had 
claimed or could claim ownership interest in submerged tidelands). 
355. In his desire to have ecological concerns drive takings jurisprudence, Professor 
Hunter expects landowners to understand both that rule changes affecting their property 
will act retrospectively and that the marketplace will make adjustments to take care of any 
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same time, Lucas has aligned takings jurisprudence more closely 
with the public's expectations about inherently public property, 
such as wetlands and barrier beaches, and with the laws of nature, 
which could exert a stabilizing influence on property law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lucas, despite its rhetoric and the Cassandra-like cries of its 
dissenters, may influence takings jurisprudence less than its authors 
intended and early critics feared. Ironically, the Lucas decision 
may make it more difficult for takings claimants to successfully 
strike down environmental regulations. The doctrines of custom 
and public trust could thwart the decision's preference for private 
property rights by underscoring the public's superior right to ac-
cess and use certain resources, but this is not as destabilizing as it 
sounds because both common law doctrines are a reflection of 
public expectations. 
The most significant change Lucas has made in takings juris-
prudence is to shift its focus to the states. The content of the new 
takings paradigm established in Lucas will be defined by each 
state's common law of nuisance and property.356 This presents a 
unique opportunity to merge the laws of ecology with the laws that 
govern the use and disposal of property. Even with the possibility 
of significant state-to-state variation, one would nevertheless ex-
pect common holdings to emerge affirming the need to preserve 
critical ecosystems like wetlands and barrier beaches because of 
public understandings about the importance of those systems. How 
successfully the new common law takings jurisprudence will now 
fulfill property owners' expectations about their bundle of rights in 
the twentieth century awaits Lucas' state progeny. 
unfairness that results. See Hunter, Ecological Perspective, supra note 167, at 381 
(advocating that anyone investing in real estate should know that certain undeveloped lands 
invite special regulation). 
356. The extent to which the Court will allow the lower courts to develop back-
ground principles of common law freely and to mediate the clash of expectational interests 
remains to be seen. At least one scholar worries that their evolution "will be hemmed and 
hobbled by federally enforced 'objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents,"' 
which in turn might emerge into "a supervening federal law of damnum absque injuria 
(loss without injury) to protect private owners' right to engage in harm-producing uses of 
land." Humbach, Nuisance, supra note 9, at 16. 
